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Economics is the science that studies the allocation of scarce resources. Many economic
models have been developed to investigate how to distribute resources more efficiently.
However, only since the middle of the second half of the last century (e.g. Diamond
1970) it has been realized that there are important frictions on the market that may lead
to inefficiencies, failure, or a significant redistribution of welfare. This thesis focuses on
(two of) these frictions, search and switching costs, and their interactions with other
economic phenomena such as behavioral biases and retention offers.
Search costs are the costs consumers have to incur in order to obtain information
about a product and its price. These exist in many forms, such as fuel costs that have
to be incurred to visit a shop, time spent reading a product description, or energy and
internet costs paid to browse websites. Switching costs, on the other hand, are costs
to switch from one supplier to another once the product and its price are fully known.
These might exist in the form of a fine for terminating the current contract prematurely
or as the administrative cost and effort to inform other parties about your new phone
or bank account number. Another interesting example of switching costs exists in the
marriage market, as switching from partner may lead to loss of contact with children
or income.
The aim of this thesis is to provide insights in the mechanisms that are active
in markets with search and/or switching costs. This thesis consists of, besides this
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introduction, four chapters. Each of these is self-contained and therefore there is no
need to elaborately discuss them here. Instead I will give a short overview of their aims,
results, and contributions to the literature.
Chapter 2. Search when Consumers Are Loss Averse
Chapter 2 studies the interaction between search costs and loss aversion. Loss aversion is
a behavioral bias that was first identified in the seminal paper of Kahneman and Tversky
(1979). The concept of the bias is that if outcomes differ from a reference point (often
based on the consumer’s expectations) then disappointments yield additional disutility,
while pleasant surprises provide additional positive utility – but at a lower rate.
A small part of the behavioral economics literature, which studies to what extent
competitive firms can take advantage of behavioral biases and how market performance
is affected as a result, already focuses on loss aversion. Prominent examples are Heid-
hues and Ko¨szegi (2008) and Karle and Peitz (2014). In these papers, consumers are
disappointed if they end up with a product that is further from their most preferred
product than what they ex ante expected. Also, they experience a disutility if they
observe a price that is higher than the tentative equilibrium price. In turn, this affects
that equilibrium price.
In this body of work it is assumed that all products are readily observable. Con-
sumers thus have to simultaneously evaluate all the products on offer, and hence they
also have to evaluate feelings of gain or loss regarding those offerings simultaneously.
A more natural environment would allow consumers to evaluate offers from firms se-
quentially. A consumer may then be disappointed if the product that she is currently
considering or its price is worse than expected, and may decide whether to evaluate the
next product on the basis of that.
Chapter 2 exactly models such an environment. In a framework of costly consumer
search with differentiated products, it introduces consumer loss aversion. The chapter
builds on the seminal papers of Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999)
in which consumers sequentially search firms to find one that offers a product that is
sufficiently to their liking. In such setting consumers are allowed to feel an additional




value than what they expected to find. The chapter also allows for the possibility that a
consumer experiences additional gains if she finds a product with a better match value
or price than expected.
Loss aversion is found to lead to a range of possible Nash equilibria, as is also the case
in e.g. Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008). As in their work, the upper bound on equilibrium
prices increases in the extent of loss aversion, but different from their results the lower
bound might decrease. Hence, loss aversion may lead to lower prices.
In the model, loss aversion may affect consumers in three dimensions. First, loss
aversion affects consumers in the price dimension: consumers are disappointed when
they encounter a price that is higher than expected. When viewed in isolation, this chan-
nel leads to weakly lower prices, as it makes firms more reluctant to increase prices.
Second, loss aversion affects consumers in the search dimension: they may be disap-
pointed when they have to search more often than expected. When viewed in isolation,
this leads to unambiguously higher prices since it effectively increases search costs.
Third, loss aversion affects consumers in the match value (or product preference) di-
mension. In isolation, this leads to unambiguously higher prices as well, as the range of
possible match values is now higher, leading effectively to more product differentiation
and hence higher prices. In addition loss aversion is found to yield more search when
search costs are relatively low, but less search when they are relatively high.
Taken together, the total effect of loss aversion on prices is ambiguous. Therefore
the chapter introduces an equilibrium refinement which essentially allows consumers
to make infinitesimally small mistakes with respect to the Nash equilibrium price on
which market participants coordinate. The unique price that survives this refinement
is decreasing in the extent of loss aversion for intermediate search costs and relatively
high loss aversion, and increasing otherwise.
Chapter 3. Directed Consumer Search
On many markets there are multiple suppliers who offer products which differ in several
dimensions. To find the best offer on these market consumers will have to search. They
can search in a random way, but they can also rely on intermediating parties such
as search engines and online marketplaces to obtain information on which seller offers
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a product and deal to their liking. For example, if a consumer wants to buy a new
computergame, shopping websites suggest titles based on her order history. Besides
entering a product name into a search engine or comparison website people can also
specify some features they like. It is clear that internet allows the search order to depend
upon one’s preferences, however, even oﬄine this possibility exists. A person looking
for some classical literature will not be directed to the comics section in a bookstore,
and a person looking to buy a car with high MPG will not start searching at a car
dealer who primarily advertizes SUV’s.
New insights are offered in chapter 3 by allowing consumer preferences to affect
the listing order on intermediating platforms, and therefore the search process of con-
sumers. In the model that is presented in that chapter a product consists of so-called
communicable and incommunicable horizontal characteristics. For instance, consider a
consumer wanting to rent a house. She visits a platform in order to find a property to
her liking. On the platform she might, for example, indicate that she prefers a house
in close proximity to her new workplace, this is a communicable characteristics. The
platform suggests, based on this information, the real-estate agent at which the con-
sumer is most likely to find the most suitable house. Hence, the consumer is directed
in her search for the best house. In turn the consumer visits the website of suggested
real-estate agent in order to find out the price and inspect the product’s incommunica-
ble characteristics, such as whether the house’s layout is convenient. She can then rent
the property or decide to continue her search until she does find an offer to her liking.
Prices and profits are found to be higher when consumers are directed in their
search. The reason is that sellers exploit the fact that consumers are less likely to visit
a competitor when they first visit the seller with the best communicable attributes.
In effect, when product characteristics are communicated products are ex-ante less
homogeneous for consumers. This result on prices is opposite to that of models in
which one seller is made prominent and all consumers sample this seller first. There
the prominent seller sets a lower price as compared to the case of random search as
she faces less elastic demand. The other sellers, on the other hand, face more elastic
demand and therefore charge higher prices.
Chapter 3 considers the welfare effects of search as well. On average consumers




since they first visit the seller where they are most likely to find the product that
matches their preferences the best. In addition, consumers are more likely to cease
their search in each stage of the process. The reason is that consumers realize that the
first seller they visit offers a product which is, for certain characteristics, the best on the
market. Therefore consumers spend less on search costs. Because of these two effects
the total welfare is higher under the alternative search strategy compared to the case
of random search. Under the alternative search strategy, however, consumers are worse
off as these two effects are outweighed by the higher prices they have to pay.
Again it is interesting to compare this result with models in which one seller is
made prominent. There consumers also search less, although for a different reason. In
those models the first seller sets a lower price than the competition and consumers are
therefore more likely to buy there. This means that some consumers do not search
beyond the first seller although it would be socially optimal. Hence, in those models
consumer obtaion on average a lower match value than in case of random search. This
implies that in those models non-random search leads to lower total welfare while in
my model it has the opposite effect.
The result that welfare is raised by directing consumers in their search has one
important implication. Consider a profit maximizing platform that provides a link
between consumers and sellers. If, by charging both consumers and sellers, the platform
is able to extract total welfare it will have an incentive to suggest different sellers for
different groups of consumers depending on consumer’s preferences.
Chapter 3 extends the seminal work of Anderson and Renault (1999) in which con-
sumers visit sellers in a random order. By introducing communicable characteristics I
allow the search order to be influenced by consumer preferences. The model of Anderson
and Renault (1999) can be obtained from the one presented in Chapter 3 by allowing
a product only to consist of incommunicable characteristics. However, in the other ex-
treme, when all product characteristics are available to consumers prior to search, the
paradox of Diamond (1971) results. My work inherits the result from Anderson and
Renault (1999) that prices are non-decreasing in search costs.
Chapter 3 contributes to two strands of literature. First, it extends to the literature
on consumer search with differentiated products, in which the classic papers by Wolinsky
(1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) play a central role. These and most subsequent
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works assume that consumers search at random. An exception close to my work is
Armstrong et al. (2009). In this paper one seller in the market is allowed to be
prominent, and this seller is always sampled first. This a-symmetry is not imposed in
the model of chapter 3 and, a priori, every seller is equally likely to be visited first
by the consumer. Moreover, the consumer’s preferences are allowed to influence the
search order. These subtle differences in modeling leads to some interesting opposite
conclusions.
Second, chapter 3 also connects to the literature on position auctions. Works in this
field typically consider sellers who differ in the likelihood that they can meet the ’need’
that a consumer has. The focus of this literature is on how the platform can maximize
profits by auctioning prominent positions to sellers but it often abstracts away from the
relationship between sellers and consumers.
Chapter 4. Winning back the unfaithful while ex-
ploiting the loyal: Retention offers and heterogeneous
switching costs
In subscription-type markets, e.g. those for credit cards, telecom, and insurance, firms
are often willing to make so-called retention offers: a better deal to consumers who
indicate that they want to cancel their subscription. Consumers’ reaction to these
practices differ. Some of them seem largely unaware of it, or at least unwilling to
exploit such offers, while others actively chase them.
In Chapter 4 retention offers are analysed in a setting with two types of consumers;
those with relatively low, and those with relatively high switching costs. Retention
offers can be used by firms to screen consumers with low switching costs. Consumers
that have already gone through the trouble of obtaining an offer from a competing firm,
signal that they have low switching costs and therefore are likely to switch. Retention
offers then effectively provide a mechanism to price discriminate against consumers with
high switching costs.
The chapter thus focuses on cases where consumers cancel their current subscription
in favor of a competitor. For example, in mobile telephony in the UK, consumers that




be communicated to their new provider to complete the switch, see Ofcom (2010).
However, when applying for such a code, the current provider often makes a retention
offer.
A two-period model is studied with two firms located at the endpoints of a Hotelling
line. In the second period, firms set prices based on consumer behavior in period 1. In
particular, firm B can charge consumers from firm A a lower price in order to try to
poach them. Once a consumer indicates that she intends to switch from A to B to take
advantage of that poaching price, however, a retention offer can be made by firm A. A
profitable strategy for low-switching-cost consumers, in the equilibrium of the model,
is to solicit offers from the competing firm to obtain a retention offer from their current
provider – even if they do not intent to switch. Securing retention offers requires costly
effort, and high-switching-cost consumers do not find making that effort worthwhile.
Hence, firms can use retention offers to price discriminate between the two types of
consumers.
Chapter 4 fits in the literature on behavior-based price discrimination and the litera-
ture on switching costs. However, studies on retention offers are scarce. Papers that do
study this subject either consider, different from this chapter, a market of homogeneous
goods, or do not allow consumers to strategically solicit an offer from a competing firm,
in an attempt to obtain a better deal from their current supplier.
The analysis in Chapter 4 suggest that the possibility of retention offers increases
prices. Prices for loyal consumers increase, as these consumers are less likely to switch
on average. But poaching prices increase as well; low-cost consumers become easier
to poach as they already have incurred part of their switching costs. Prices in the
first period increase as well. As competition for consumers with low switching costs is
fiercer in the second period, firms are less eager to attract these consumers in period
1. The welfare effects of the possibility retention offers are ambiguous. Consumers
are worse off, while firms obtain higher profits. The former applies to all individual
high-switching-cost consumers, and to consumers as a whole. The effect on the welfare
of individual low-cost consumers is ambiguous.
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Chapter 5. Marital infidelity and impatience: Infi-
delity and smoking habits
Finally, chapter 5 studies empirically a market where switching costs are substantial:
the marriage market. More specifically, I empirically investigate there the relationship
between impatience and the first step in the switch of partner: marital infidelity. Adul-
tery is a subject of substantial importance as it is the cause of many divorces. A divorce
can have severe economic consequences for a household such as the loss of income, eco-
nomics of scale and future pension entitlements. Moreover, a divorce might also affect
household members in non-pecuniary ways. It might, for instance, have a negative
impact on children’s welfare. Even in the case that a relationship survives when an
affair is disclosed, the utility derived from it might be lower as the disclosure signals
marital dissatisfaction. Additionally, the marital terms might be re-negotiated. More-
over, it is interesting to study adultery as intercourse plays an important role in society
along with its associated phenomena like contraception, sexual diseases, abortion and
shot-gun marriages.
There exists a small economic literature on the subject of adultery. This literature
considers a large set of possible determinants of infidelity, but not many papers take
into account that the consequences of an affair should be discounted as they lay in the
future. One exception is Smith (2012), who bases his approach upon the literature
of economics of crime (e.g. Becker (1968)). His model takes in account that cheating
individuals realize that their spouse might punish them once an affair is discovered. This
is the rationale for individuals to try to conceal their affairs. Smith (2012) allows an
individual’s discount factor to depend upon the level of education. However, education
is also permitted to affect the infidelity decision in other ways.
In Chapter 5 I extend the theoretical model of Smith (2012) by letting an individual’s
discount factor to be affected by his level of impatience, and I estimate it. In the
empirical analysis smoking behavior is used to measure impatience. Empirically it has
been firmly established that smokers are more impatient than non-smokers.
The estimated coefficients on the variables related to smoking are found to be signif-
icant. In the literature it is found that persons who (used to) smoke are more impatient.




Hence, the discounted expected costs should be accounted for when modeling infidelity.
Some new light is also shed on the relationship between infidelity and education
by the analysis. Fair (1978), a seminal work in this branch of literature, found that
education is negatively associated with infidelity and occupation positively. As both
education and occupation are proxies for wages this is somewhat surprising, and the
time allocation framework that Fair (1978) employs cannot explain this. My model
and that of Smith (2012) do offer an explanation for the opposing signs of education
and occupation through the following mechanisms. Occupation measures a person’s
quality as a sexual partner and the related benefits from an extramarital affair. It
does not capture a person’s sexual desirability fully, but still it is clearly positively
correlated to his socio-economic status. On the other hand, the likelihood of adultery
is affected by education in three ways. Firstly, schooling affects an individual’s quality
as more educated individuals are able to find better jobs and collect higher wages. This
is the argument that Fair (1978) used to justify schooling as a wage proxy. Secondly,
education raises a person’s social skills. Through these two mechanisms schooling adds
to the benefits of an affair and raises a person’s desirability. Thirdly, higher educated
persons have a lower discount factor for the expected costs of an affair. This provides the
reason why infidelity might be negatively correlated with education. Smith (2012) finds,
as Fair (1978), the relation between schooling and adultery to be negative. Chapter 5,
however, shows that the discounting-effect of education is (partly) filtered out once one
controls for the impatience level of an individual. As a result the quality (signaling)
effect of education becomes more dominant, and the association between schooling and
infidelity becomes more positive. I find that the relationship between schooling and
extramarital sex even becomes positive for some of the estimations, which suggests that
it is important to control for impatience when modeling infidelity.
Concluding thoughts
To conclude, this thesis provides interesting insights in the effects of search and switching
costs, possibly in combination with other economic phenomena such as loss aversion and
retention offers. An important finding is that firm activities which might seem to benefit
consumers, such as retention offers or communicating product information, actually
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decrease consumer surplus and increase profits. Moreover, heterogenous switching costs
are shown to have a relevant impact on market mechanisms. Chapter 5 shows the
empirical effects of the components of these costs, while chapter 4 proves that such
heterogeneity offers strategic possibilities. The role of behavioral biases on markets
should also not be underestimated, which is apparent from chapter 2 where the amount
of loss aversion determines the price level. Economic policy (for markets with search
and switching costs), and the models on which this is build, should therefore take these
phenomena into account before drawing conclusions.
The remainder of this thesis consist of two parts. The first part focuses on the subject
of search costs and presents the above discussed chapters 2 and 3. The other chapters
that are described above, chapters 4 and 5, make up the second part of the thesis, which









Search when Consumers Are Loss Averse∗
2.1 Introduction
Over the last years, a literature has emerged that studies competition in a world where
consumers are less than fully rational (see e.g. Spiegler, 2011). Inspired by systematic
biases unearthed by the experimental and behavioral economics literature, this literature
studies to what extent competitive firms can take advantage of such behavioral biases,
and how market performance is affected as a result.
One behavioral bias that has received particular attention is that of loss aversion. If
outcomes differ from a reference point (often based on the consumer’s expectations) then
disappointments yield additional disutility, while present surprises provide additional
positive utility – but at a lower rate. This bias was first identified in the seminal paper
of Kahneman and Tversky (1979). To formally study the effect of such gain-loss utility
in a decision-making framework, Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) introduce the concept of
personal equilibrium, which requires that an agent’s behavior optimally and rationally
takes into account the possibility of future gain-loss utility in an intertemporal context.
A small literature has originated that studies the effect of gain-loss utility on the func-
tioning of markets. Prominent examples include Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008) and Karle
and Peitz (2014). In these papers, consumers are disappointed if they end up with a
product that is further from their most preferred product than what they expected
ex-ante. Also, they experience a disutility if they observe a price that is higher than
∗This chapter is based on Haan and Siekman (2015a).
502107-L-bw-Siekman
2
14 Search and Switching Costs
the tentative equilibrium price. In turn, this affects that equilibrium price.
Yet, in this literature it is assumed that all products are readily observable. Consumers
thus have to simultaneously evaluate all the products on offer, and hence they also have
to evaluate feelings of gain or loss regarding those offerings simultaneously. A more
natural environment would allow consumers to evaluate firm offerings sequentially. A
consumer may then be disappointed if the product that she is currently considering or
its price is worse than what she expected, and may decide whether to evaluate the next
product on the basis of that.
In this chapter, we model exactly that. In a framework of costly consumer search with
differentiated products, we introduce consumer loss aversion. We build on the semi-
nal papers of Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) in which consumers
sequentially search firms to find one that offers a product that is sufficiently to their
liking. In such a model we allow consumers to feel an additional loss whenever they
encounter a product that is more expensive or that has a lower match value than what
they expected to find. Moreover, we propose an equilibrium refinement to deal with
the multiplicity of equilibria that are routinely found in competition models with loss
aversion. That refinement yields a unique equilibrium and is also readily applicable to
other competition models with loss averse consumers.
We find that loss aversion leads to a range of possible Nash equilibria, as is also the
case in e.g. Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008). Yet, different from their work, we find that
although the upper bound on equilibrium prices increases in the extent of loss aversion,
the lower bound might decrease. Hence, loss aversion may lead to lower prices. We also
propose an equilibrium refinement that yields a unique equilibrium. This refinement
essentially allows consumers to make infinitesimally small mistakes with respect to the
Nash equilibrium on which market participants coordinate.
In our model, loss aversion may affect consumers in three dimensions. First, loss aver-
sion affects consumers in the price dimension: consumers are disappointed when they
encounter a price that is higher than expected. When viewed in isolation, this channel
leads to weakly lower prices, as it makes firms more reluctant to increase prices. Sec-
ond, loss aversion affects consumers in the search dimension: they may be disappointed
when they have to search more often than expected. When viewed in isolation, this
leads to unambiguously higher prices since it effectively increases search costs. Third,
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loss aversion affects consumers in the match value (or product preference) dimension.
In isolation, this leads to unambiguously higher prices as well, as the range of possi-
ble match values is now higher, leading effectively to more price discrimination and
hence higher prices. The total effect is ambiguous. Loss aversion yields more search
when search costs are relatively low, but less search when they are relatively high. The
unique price that survives our equilibrium refinement is decreasing in the extent of loss
aversion for intermediate search costs and relatively high loss aversion, and increasing
otherwise.
In sequential search models like the one we are considering in this chapter, consumers
search until they find a match value that is sufficiently high such that continuing search
is not worth their while. In our base analysis we assume that consumers take into
account that in equilibrium they will end up with a match value that is at least this
high. Any lower match value will then be a disappointment. In an extension we study
the case in which the entire distribution of match values acts as a reference. In that case,
we find the same qualitative results. The unique price that survives our equilibrium
refinement is decreasing in loss aversion for small search costs and large loss aversion,
and increasing otherwise.
Related literature includes the following. Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008) use the approach
of Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) to study the effect of loss averse consumers on a Salop circle
and find that such loss aversion weakly increases equilibrium prices. In their model,
consumers use the equilibrium price as a reference point, as we do in this chapter.
However, deals are simultaneously evaluated and search costs play no role. In Zhou
(2011) the offer of the first firm that consumers visit serves as a reference point. He finds
that the more ‘prominent’ firm whose product is taken as the reference point by more
consumers will randomize between a high and a low price. Consumer loss aversion in
the price dimension intensifies competition while that in the product dimension softens
competition. Contrary to Zhou (2011) we endogenize the search order of the firms.
In Karle and Peitz (2014), consumers are located on a Salop circle and know prices
before reference points are formed. Spiegler (2012) takes Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008)
and Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) as a starting point. However, in this paper consumers
are only loss averse in the price dimension and consumers have a single reference point
which equals the expected price of the monopolistic firm. The setup leads to prices being
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lower with loss aversion. Karle (2015) studies the effect of loss aversion on advertising,
while Rosato (2014) considers a monopolist that sells differentiated products and takes
advantage of loss aversion to use limited availability to steer consumers towards the
more profitable product.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the
standard model of search with differentiated products, that serves as a benchmark to
our model with reference dependent consumers. In Section 2.3 we introduce loss aversion
in that model and give the formal requirements for a solution. Existence of equilibrium
is considered in Section 2.4. To derive an explicit solution and do comparative statics,
we focus on the case of uniformly distributed match values in Section 2.5. Section
2.6 introduces our equilibrium refinement and studies its implications. We consider
two extensions in Section 2.7: one with an alternative reference point in the match-
value dimension (Section 2.7.1), and one that also allows for gain utility (Section 2.7.2).
Section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Benchmark Model
For ease of exposition, we start with the standard model of search with differentiated
products that does not have loss aversion. This largely follows Anderson and Re-
nault (1999). Consider a market where n firms sell horizontally differentiated products.
Marginal costs are constant and normalized to zero.Consider one consumer among the
infinitely many on the market. Absent loss aversion, she derives utility
U i(pi, εi) ≡ v + u(pi, εi) = v + εi − pi (2.1)
if she buys product i at price pi, i = 1, . . . , n, where the stand alone utility of buyting
the product, v, is large enough such that the consumer always buys in equilibrium.
We assume that εi is the realization of a random variable with distribution F and
continuously differentiable log-concave1 density f with support normalized to [0, 1]. It
can be interpreted as a match value between the consumer and the good sold by firm i.
Match values are independently distributed across products. Firms cannot observe εi
so price discrimination is not feasible. The consumer only learns εi and pi upon visiting
1Log-concavity of f is a common assumption in the literature. The densities of the normal and
uniform distribution are for instance log-concave.
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firm i. To visit firm i the consumer must incur a search cost s. She searches sequentially
with perfect recall.
Suppose the buyer approaches some firm i in her first search. Assume for now that all
firms charge the equilibrium price p∗. If the consumer buys from i she obtains gross
utility v + ui, with ui ≡ u(p∗, εi) = εi − p∗. A visit to some other firm j will give her
utility v + εj − p∗. This is higher than the utility from buying from firm i if εj > εi.




(ε− εi) f (ε) dε. (2.2)
The consumer is willing to do an additional search whenever b(εi) ≥ s, or εi ≤ εˆ, with
εˆ implicitly defined by
b (εˆ) = s. (2.3)
To derive p∗, suppose firm i defects by setting some pi. Define ∆ ≡ pi − p∗. The
probability that the consumer stops searching at i conditional on her visiting i, is given
by
Pr[εi − pi > εˆ− p∗] = Pr [εi > εˆ+ ∆] = 1− F (εˆ+ ∆). (2.4)
The probability that i is sampled first equals 1/n. Suppose a different firm is sampled
first. The probability that the consumer will not buy there equals F (εˆ). Hence, the
probability that i is sampled second is F (εˆ)/n. More generally, the probability that it is
sampled kth is F (εˆ)k−1/n, k = 1, . . . , n. The probability that the consumer buys from







F (εˆ)k [1− F (εˆ+ ∆)] +
∫ εˆ+∆
−∞
F (ε−∆)n−1 f (ε) dε. (2.5)
The last term reflects the probability that the consumer returns to firm i after having
visited all firms and learning that i offers the highest net utility. Maximizing profits
pii(pi, p
∗) = piD(pi, p∗) with respect to pi and imposing symmetry, equilibrium prices




1−F (εˆ) f(εˆ)− n
∫ εˆ
−∞ f
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Anderson and Renault (1999) give conditions under which this is indeed a global max-
imum.
In the remainder of this chapter we will look at the case of infinitely many firms, so
n → ∞. This greatly simplifies the analysis, and allows us to do comparative statics.
With infinitely many firms, a consumer will never return to a firm that she has visited






2.3 Search with loss aversion
Introduction We now introduce reference-dependent utility to this model. Following
Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006), we look for a personal equilibrium; a consumption plan
consistent with optimal behavior, given expectations, and given a reference point that
consumers are using.
Before a consumer embarks on the search for a product, she has expectations concerning
the price she will end up paying, the match value she will end up with, and the amount
of search cost she has to incur. Hence, in all these three dimensions there is scope
for disappointment or pleasant surprises. Consistent with earlier literature, we assume
that losses in each dimension are evaluated separately, so that all disappointments and
pleasant surprises enter the utility function additively.
A consumer obtains a disutility λx over and above her standard utility, if the outcome
is x worse than the reference point that she expected in that dimension. As in standard
gain-loss utility theory, we could also allow for an additional utility λGy when the
outcome is y better than her reference point, with λG = γλ and γ < 1. For simplicity
we will not do so (and hence set γ = 0) in the main text, and consider the case γ > 0
in Section 2.7.2.
Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006) explicitly allow decision makers to use reference distributions
rather than reference points. For example, if a consumer expects a match value from a
distribution G on [0, 1] and she finds some ε, then that is a disappointment relative to




(ξ − ε) g(ξ)dξ.
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It is crucial how and when the reference points are determined against which losses are
evaluated. In Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008), consumers expect to find the equilibrium
price p∗ and are disappointed when they find a price pi > p∗. Moreover, they expect
to experience some match value χˆ, and are disappointed whenever χ < χˆ. In Karle
and Peitz (2014) consumers already know the distributions of prices and firm match
values before forming reference points: the reference distributions are the distributions
of prices and match values. We take a similar approach in our model.2
In the price dimension, we take the reference price to be the (tentative) equilibrium
price p∗. Hence, a consumer is disappointed and experiences additional loss utility if
the firm she visits has a price pi > p
∗. In the search dimension, we take the reference
point to be the probability that she continues search. With reservation utility εˆ, she
will continue search with probability F (εˆ). If she does continue search, that will be a
disappointment relative to that probability.
It is less straightforward to determine the proper reference point in the match-value
dimension. Suppose a consumer visits a firm and finds match value ε. First, note that
she expected to find a draw from F on [0, 1]. Hence, we could use that distribution
as the reference distribution. Second, when using reservation utility εˆ, this consumer
knows in advance that she will continue search until she finds a match value ε ≥ εˆ.
Hence, she knows in advance that she will end up with a match value ε that is a draw
from F, but conditional on it being bigger than εˆ. Therefore, we could also use that as
our match value distribution. Third, if the consumer finds some match value εi, but
she continues search, one could also argue that her proper reference point should be εi,
as that is her best match value so far.
The third option would however yield technical problems as with optimal search it
would lead to a reservation utility εˆ that is no longer stationary, as it depends on the
match values that have already been sampled. That yields huge technical difficulties,
hence we prefer not to take that route. In the remainder of the paper we choose the
second option; the consumer expects to find some ε ≥ εˆ, hence any lower ε would be a
disappointment. In Section 2.7.1, we consider the first option in an extension.
2The use of the term ‘match value’ is somewhat confusing in this context, as both papers consider
a Salop circle rather than a model with match values in the sense of Perloff and Salop (1985), as we
do. The crucial difference is that in our case match values are independently distributed across firms.
On a Salop circle, whenever a consumer moves closer to a particular firm, her match value with that
firm increases, but her match value with the firm located at the other side of her necessarily decreases.
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Personal equilibrium We look for a reservation utility that is consistent with per-
sonal equilibrium. In the discussion that follows, we thus have to distinguish between
a possible reservation utility ˆ that a consumer could use, and the reservation utility εˆ
that is consistent with personal equilibrium. We thus look for a particular ˆ such that,
when rationally taking all possible disappointments into account a priori, our consumer
indeed wants to continue search whenever she finds an εi < ˆ. Consistent with our
analysis without loss aversion, we denote the ˆ for which that holds as εˆ.
As argued, loss aversion affects a consumer’s decision in 3 possible ways; in the match
utility dimension, the price dimension, and the search dimension. In the match di-
mension, we define the adjusted match utility as the utility the consumer obtains from
consuming the product of firm i, after taking into account any disappointments3 from
that product. Obviously, this will depend on the original match utility εi, but also on ˆ:
a higher ˆ implies that the consumer expects to end up with a higher εi and hence will
be more disappointed if the match utility she finds falls short of ˆ. We will formalize this
in more detail below. Hence we can write the adjusted match utility as εL (εi; ˆ) , where
the subscript L denotes that we take loss aversion into account. Absent loss aversion,
we simply have εL (εi, ˆ) = εi.
Disutility in the price dimension will be affected by the price firm i charges, pi, but also
by the price the consumer expects to find – which will be the (tentative) equilibrium
price p∗. Hence, for price disutility we can write pL (pi; p∗) . Absent loss aversion, we
simply have pL (pi; p
∗) = pi. In the search dimension, search disutility will depend
on the search cost plus the extent of disappointment with the amount of search she
undertakes. The latter will be affected by how often she expected to search, which
is determined by ˆ. Hence, for search disutility we can write sL (s, ˆ) . The utility a
consumer obtains when she buys at firm i is now given by
U iL (pi, εi; p
∗, ˆ) = v + εL (εi; ˆ)− pL (pi; p∗) .
At equal prices, we denote the expected benefits from search when observing εi and using
reservation utility ˆ as bL (εi, ˆ) . Along the lines in the previous section, the consumer
search rule is consistent with personal equilibrium if, at equal prices, whenever she
encounters an εi = ˆ, she is indifferent between continuing search and buying. Hence,
3Or pleasant surprises, in the case that γ > 0.
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a personal equilibrium has the consumer continue searching when she encounters an
εi < εˆ, with εˆ implicitly defined by
bL (εˆ; εˆ) = sL (s; εˆ) .
We will now derive the functions we have defined above.
Analysis First, consider the match dimension. By construction, the consumer con-
tinues search until she finds a match value at least equal to ˆ. Hence, she expects to
obtain a match value that is a draw from the distribution
H(ξ; ˆ) = Pr (ε < ξ|ξ > ˆ) = F (ξ)− F (ˆ)
1− F (ˆ) . (2.8)
Thus, H is the posterior distribution of ε, given that it is higher than ˆ. For every value
of εi that a consumer may encounter at firm i, the adjusted match utility εL after taking










(τ − εi)dH(τ) if εi ≥ ˆ. (2.9)
Here, λM is the loss aversion parameter in the match value dimension. We believe
that the most natural assumption is to have the loss aversion parameter being equal
in all three dimensions that we consider. Still, in our analysis we do allow them to
differ. This allows us to trace the effects that we find to the three channels we consider.
It is easy to see that adjusted match utility is strictly increasing in εi. We denote its
cumulative probability distribution by FL (ε; ˆ). The adjusted match utility distribution
then follows straightforwardly from the unadjusted match value distribution F (ε) .




∗) = pi + λP (pi − p∗) 1{pi>p∗},
with 1 the indicator function and λP the loss aversion parameter in the price dimension.
In the search dimension, note that the consumer expects to buy directly from a firm
with probability 1 − F (ˆ), and to continue search with F (ˆ). Hence, if she decides to
continue searching, this is a disappointment of size s relative to all realizations of ε
where she did not expect to search. The disutility from searching is then given by
sL (s; ˆ) = s+ sλS [1− F (ˆ)] , (2.10)
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with λS the loss utility parameter in the search dimension. For the expected benefit of




[εL (ε; ˆ)− εL (εi; ˆ)] dF (ε) . (2.11)
A consumer thus continues search if εi ≤ εˆ, with εˆ implicitly defined by4
bL(εˆ; εˆ) = s+ λSs [1− F (εˆ)] . (2.12)
Equilibrium Derivation of the price equilibrium p∗ goes along the same lines as
above. Define εˆL ≡ εL (εˆ; εˆ) . Hence, εˆL is the adjusted match utility that makes the
consumer indifferent between buying immediately and continuing search, if prices are
equal. Suppose all other firms set price p∗, but firm i charges some price pi. We now
have to distinguish between two cases: one in which pi > p
∗ (and the consumer is
disappointed when observing pi), and one in which pi ≤ p∗ (and that is not the case).
We first restrict attention to downward defections, so pi < p
∗. Denote the tentative
equilibrium price as p∗A and define ∆A ≡ pi − p∗A. Similar to Section 2.2, the consumer
stops searching whenever εiL− pi ≥ εˆL− p∗A or εiL ≥ εˆL + ∆A. The probability that she
stops at i given that i is visited, is equal to
Pr[εL (εi; εˆ) > εˆL + ∆A] = 1− FL(εˆL + ∆A; εˆ). (2.13)












FL(εL −∆A; εˆ)n−1dFL(εL; εˆ). (2.14)
Profits for this case are Π(pi; p
∗
A) = piDi(pi, p
∗
A). Taking the first order condition,











4Note that bL(ˆ; ˆ) is decreasing in ˆ. We assume that s is small enough such that bL(0, 0) > s+sλS ;
otherwise there would never be any search. Also, bL(∞,∞) = 0. The term, s + λSS (1− F (ˆ))) is
decreasing in ˆ; from s+ sλS if ˆ = 0 to s if ˆ→∞. Hence, by continuity a solution always exists (but
might not be unique).
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provided the maximization problem is well defined and such a p∗A exists.
Now consider upward defections, with pi > p
∗. Denote the tentative equilibrium price
as p∗B and define ∆B ≡ pi − p∗B . The consumer will stop searching at i whenever
εiL − pi − λP∆B ≥ εˆL − p∗B or εiL ≥ εˆL + (1 + λP ) ∆B . The probability that she stops
at i given that i is visited, is equal to
Pr[εL (εi) > εˆL + (1 + λP ) ∆B ] = 1− FL(εˆL + (1 + λP ) ∆B). (2.16)
Maximizing and imposing symmetry yields
p∗B =
1− FL(εˆL; εˆ)
(1 + λP ) fL(εˆL; εˆ)
(2.17)
again provided the maximization problem is well defined and such a p∗B exists. We thus
have p∗B = p
∗
A/ (1 + λP ) , hence p
∗
B ≤ p∗A.
Hence, when allowing for downward defections, we find that p∗A is the unique equilibrium
price. This implies that firms do have an incentive to defect to a lower price from any
tentative equilibrium p∗ > p∗A, but not from a p
∗ < p∗A. When allowing for upward
defections, we find that p∗B is the unique equilibrium price. This implies that firms do
have an incentive to defect to a higher price from any tentative equilibrium p∗ < p∗B ,
but not from a p∗ > p∗B . Given that p
∗
B ≤ p∗A, this implies that firms have no incentive
to defect from any p∗ ∈ [p∗B , p∗A]. We thus have a continuum of Nash equilibria.
For the general case, it is hard to do comparative statics. In Section 2.5 we there-
fore simplify by assuming that F (ε) is a uniform distribution.5 But we first discuss
conditions for the existence of equilibrium in the general case.
2.4 Existence of equilibrium
We showed that our search model with loss aversion has a continuum of equilibria
[p∗B , p
∗
A], provided that those values exist. From Anderson and Renault (1999), absent
loss aversion the equilibrium exists if 1−F is logconcave and the number of firms goes
to infinity (their Proposition B1). With a finite number of firms, it is sufficient to have
1−F logconcave and f ′ ≥ 0 (which follows directly from their Proposition B2). In our
5If n < ∞ a consumer no longer is certain she will end up with a match value of at
least εˆ. This fact complicates H and FL and hence the analysis severely. Moreover, consumers
might return after visiting all n firms to an earlier visited firm. We thus have to evaluate∫ εˆL+∆B [1+λP I{∆B>0}]
−∞ FL
(
εL −∆B [1 + λP I{∆B>0}]
)n−1
dFL (εL), which is non-trivial.
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case, as we focus on a monopolistic setting, this immediately implies that p∗B and p
∗
A
exist if 1 − FL is logconcave. In this section, we show that logconcavity of 1 − F and
f ′ ≥ 0 is sufficient for that to hold.
We closely follow Theorem 7 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005), that looks at logconcavity
of F rather than 1−F, in a similar problem. First note (ln (1− F ))′ = −f/(1−F ), so
(ln (1− F ))′′ = − (1− F ) f
′ − f2
(1− F )2 .





1− F > 0. (2.18)
Consider FL ≡ F (εL (ε)) . We have (ln (1− F (εL (ε))))′ = −fε′L/(1− F ) so
(ln (1− F (εL (ε))))′′ =
− (1− F )
(
f ′ · (ε′L)2 + f · ε′′L
)
− (f · ε′L)2
(1− F )2 .








1− F > 0. (2.19)














0 if ε ≤ εˆ
−λMh(ε) if ε > εˆ.
Therefore, for ε ≤ εˆ, condition (2.19) is always satisfied if (2.18) is. Let’s now focus on
the case ε > εˆ. Note from (2.8) that
h (ε) =
f (ε)
1− F (εˆ) ,∫ ∞
ε
dH (τ) = 1−H (ε) = 1− F (ε)













6The square is missing in Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005). We take that to be a typo.
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= f · λ
2 (1− F )2 + λDen (1− F ) + Den2
(1− F ) (λ (1− F ) + Den)2 > 0.
That implies that f ′ ≥ 0 is sufficient for (2.19) to be satisfied.
2.5 A uniform distribution of match values
In this section, we consider a uniform distribution of match values on [0, 1]. Note that
this domain is just for ease of exposition; a wider range of match values, for example,
is equivalent to having lower search costs.
Distribution of εL Given that a consumer continues search until she finds εi ≥ ˆ,
the match utility she ends up with (not taking into account the effects of loss aversion)




so h(ξ, ˆ) = 1/ (1− ˆ). From (2.9), we then have
εL(εi; ˆ) =
{
εi − 12λM (1 + ˆ− 2εi) if εi ≤ ˆ
εi − 12λM · (1−εi)
2
1−ˆ if εi ≥ ˆ.
(2.20)
Note that εL(ˆ; ˆ) = limεi↑ˆ εL(εi; ˆ) = limεi↓ˆ εL(εi; ˆ) = ˆ− 12λM (1− ˆ).
First consider the case that εi ≤ ˆ or εL ≤ ˆ− 12λM (1− ˆ). Then













ξ + 12λM (1 + ˆ)
1 + λM
. (2.21)
With εi ≥ ˆ we have
FL(ξ; ˆ) = Pr
(
εi − λM (1− εi)
2



























From (2.21) and (2.22),
lim
ξ↑ˆ




























(1− ˆ)2 (2λM + 3) . (2.23)
Equating this to sL (s; ˆ) ≡ s (1 + λS (1− ˆ)) yields





9s2λ2S + 12sλM + 18s, (2.24)
as the other root is larger than 1.7 With εˆL ≤ εˆ, we have fL(εˆL) = 1/ (1 + λM ). From
(2.15) and (2.17) we then have:
Proposition 2.1. When match values are uniformly distributed on [0, 1], there is a
continuum of Nash equilibria on [p∗B , p
∗
A], with











(1− εˆ) (1 + λM )





From Section 2.4, sufficient for existence is for 1 − F to be logconcave, and to have
f ′ ≥ 0. Both conditions are clearly satisfied.
The impact of loss aversion We can now show the following:
Proposition 2.2. The effect of loss aversion on the upper bound on equilibrium prices
p∗A and the lower bound p
∗
B, is as follows:
7Absent loss aversion, we have (1 − εˆ)2/2 = s, so for the model to make sense, we need s ≤ 1/2,
otherwise a consumer would never search beyond the first firm. With loss aversion
(2λ+ 3)(1− εˆ)2
6 (1 + λ(1− εˆ)) = s.
The left-hand side is highest for εˆ = 0, when it becomes
(2λ+3)
6(1+λ)






Hence, we’re fine as long as s ≤ 1/3.
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a. An increase in loss aversion λ increases p∗A; it increases p
∗
B when search costs are
sufficiently high, but decreases it otherwise.
b. Loss aversion in the search and match dimensions increase p∗A, while loss aversion
in the price dimension has no effect on p∗A.
c. Loss aversion in the search and match dimension increase p∗B, but loss aversion
in the price dimension decreases p∗B .
Proof. For the impact of λM , note from (2.25) that the first two terms are strictly
increasing in λM . This implies that p
∗
A also is. The same holds for p
∗
B in (2.26). The
effects of λS and λP follow immediately from (2.25) and (2.26).




























= 0, we immediately have
∂p∗A
∂λ > 0. The impact on p
∗
B is








(2λ+ 3)− 2 (3sλ+R)
(2λ+ 3)2
This has the same sign as(
9s2λ+ 6s+ 3sR
)
(2λ+ 3)− 2 (3sλ+R)R
= −2R2 + 9Rs+ 3s (2λ+ 3) (3sλ+ 2) (2.29)
= −2 (9s2λ2 + 12sλ+ 18s)+ 9Rs+ 3s (2λ+ 3) (3sλ+ 2)
= 9Rs− 3s (6 + 4λ− 9sλ) . (2.30)
With s < 1/3, we have 6 + 4λ − 9sλ > 0. Hence, (2.30) is positive if and only if
3R > 6 + 4λ− 9sλ or
9s
(
9λ2 + 12λ+ 18
)− (6 + 4λ− 9sλ)2 > 0.
For s = 0, the expression is − (6 + 4λ)2 < 0, For s = 1/3, it equals 26λ2 +24λ+18 > 0.
Also, the expression is strictly increasing in s.8 Hence, there is a unique sˆ ∈ (0, 1/3)
8The derivative with respect to s equals 9
(
9λ2 + 12λ+ 18
)
+18λ (6 + 4λ− 9sλ) = 216λ+153λ2−
162sλ2 + 162 ≥ 216λ+ 153λ2 − 162λ2/3 + 162 = 99λ2 + 216λ+ 162 > 0.
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such that
∂p∗B
∂λ ≤ 0 for s < sˆ and ∂p
∗
B
∂λ > 0 otherwise.
9 
We thus find that loss aversion leads to a range of possible Nash equilibria, as is also the
case in e.g. Heidhues and Ko¨szegi (2008). Yet, different from their work, we find that
although the upper bound on equilibrium prices increases in the extent of loss aversion,
the lower bound might decrease. Hence, loss aversion may lead to lower prices.
Loss aversion in the search dimension leads to unambiguously higher effective search
costs, as having to continue search will always entail some disappointment. This un-
ambiguously leads to higher equilibrium prices. Loss aversion in the price dimension
implies that consumers are more likely to walk away when they see a price increase,
which leads to weakly lower prices.10 Loss aversion in the match-value dimension es-
sentially leads to more product differentiation and the ex post distribution of prices will
increase;11 the highest possible match value will yield the same utility level as before,
but the lowest possible match value will yield much lower utility, as encountering that
will be a huge disappointment. In these models, more product differentiation implies
higher prices.12
It is easy to see that prices increase in search costs, as they do in the model without
loss aversion. With higher search costs, firms have more market power as consumers
are less likely to walk away.
The amount of search It is also interesting to consider the effect of loss aversion on
the equilibrium amount of search. We have the following:
Proposition 2.3. More loss aversion leads to more search when search costs are low,
but to less search when search costs are high. More loss aversion in the match-value
dimension leads to more search, more loss aversion in the search dimension leads to
9Solving explicitly for sˆ gives a particularly ugly expression that is strictly decreasing in λ and
equals sˆ = 2/9 for λ = 0 and sˆ = 1/9 for λ→∞.
10In the sense that the lower bound decreases. The upper bound is unaffected; by construction that
is the equilibrium price when only considering downward defections.
11The adjusted match value has a support on [− 1
2
λM (1 + εˆ), 1]. The original match value had a
support on [0, 1]. This means that products are more differentiated if we are able to show that the
density under loss aversion is at every point of the original support smaller than before. The density




1−εˆ . Since εL ∈ [0, 1]
on this original support and εˆ ∈ [0, 1] the result follows.
12See e.g. Proposition 2 in Anderson and Renault (1999).
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less search, while loss aversion in the price dimension has no effect on the amount of
search.
Proof. From (2.26), when loss aversion is equal in all dimensions, we have p∗B = 1− εˆ.
Above we showed ∂p∗B/∂λ ≤ 0 if and only if s < sˆ. That immediately implies that
∂εˆ/∂λ ≥ 0, so there will be more search, if and only if s < sˆ. Now consider loss aversion
in the match-value dimension. Suppose ε ≥ εˆ. From (2.9), we then have
εL(ε; εˆ)− εL(εˆ; εˆ) ≥ εi − εˆ




(εL(ε; εˆ)− εL(εˆ; εˆ)) dF (ε) ≥
∫ 1
εˆ
(ε− εˆ) dF (ε) = b(εˆ)
for any εˆ. This implies the following. Suppose that εˆ is the consumer’s reservation
utility in the model with no loss aversion, so b(εˆ) = s. Then, using that same εˆ, the
consumer with loss aversion will always have a strictly larger benefit from search. It
follows that loss aversion leads to more search on the market. The result on the search
dimension follows by taking the derivative of (2.24) with respect to λS . As we can see
in (2.24), loss aversion in the price dimension, λP , has no effect on εˆ. 
2.6 Equilibrium Refinement
In the previous sections, we solved the model to find a continuum of possible Nash
equilibria. In this section, we therefore propose an equilibrium refinement that yields a
unique equilibrium. The idea is as follows. In principle, any equilibrium p∗ ∈ [p∗B , p∗A]
could be played. Hence, consumers and firms have to coordinate on one of these in-
finitely many equilibria. Suppose that we allow consumers to make small mistakes in
the equilibrium price that is to be played. More precisely, suppose than any given con-
sumer expects p∗ + µ to be played, rather than the ‘true’ equilibrium price p∗, with µ
a draw from a uniform distribution on [−µ¯, µ¯].13 Under this assumption, we can again
13We implicitly assume that consumers do not alter their beliefs even after observing the true
equilibrium price at several firms. One alternative is to assume that if a consumer visited at least two
firms with the true equilibrium price p∗ she alters her expectations to pe = p∗. However, this would
imply that a consumer may return to the first firm after having visited the second, as her expectation
with respect to the prices that she will find at the remaining shops has now changed. This would
complicate the analysis tremendously.
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derive all equilibrium prices. If taking the limit of that sequence of equilibrium prices
when µ¯ → 0 yields a unique equilibrium price, then that is the price we expect to be
played.14
We can now show the following:




fL(εˆL) (1 + λ/2)
.
Proof. We first derive demand of firm i when it sets price pi while all others set p
∗, and
consumers make the mistakes mentioned above. Consider a consumer who visits firm
i. Suppose she expects some pe = p∗ + µ, with µ < 0. Naturally, as she still expects all
prices to be equal, εˆL will not be affected. Then, for pi sufficiently close to p
∗, she will
buy with probability
Pr(εi − pi − λP (pi − p∗ − µ) > εˆL − p∗ − µ) =
Pr(εi − λP (∆− µ) > εˆL + ∆− µ) = 1− FL(εˆL + (1 + λP ) (∆− µ)).
A consumer who visits firm i and expects some pe = p∗ + µ with µ > 0 will buy with
probability
Pr(εi > εˆL + ∆− µ) = 1− FL(εˆL + ∆− µ).
Total demand for firm i in this refinement, if i charges price pi, where the equilibrium
















FL(εˆL + (1 + λP ) (∆ + µ)) + FL(εˆL + ∆− µ)
2µ¯
dµ.
Note that we no longer have to distinguish between profits when doing an upward
defection, and profits when doing a downward defection, as regardless of the direction
of the defection, there are always consumers who expected a higher price and those
14As an alternative interpretation, our refinement is also consistent with a world in which consumers
do not make these mistakes, but firms perceive them to do so.
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that expected a lower price. Profits now equal Π¯ (pi, p















fL(εˆL + (1 + λP ) (∆ + µ)) (1 + λP ) + fL(εˆL + ∆− µ)
2µ¯
dµ.







fL(εˆL + (1 + λP )µ) (1 + λP ) + fL(εˆL − µ)
2µ¯
dµ,






= −fL(εˆL) (1 + λP /2) ,
which implies the result. 
In case of a uniform distribution, we have from the analysis in Section 2.5,
p¯∗ =
1 + λM




9s2λ2S + 12λMs+ 18s
)
.
This is increasing in λM , decreasing in λP and increasing in λS . With the same λ in all
dimensions, the expression collapses to
p¯∗ =
2 (1 + λ)




9s2λ2 + 12λs+ 18s
)
.
Unfortunately, it is hard to do comparative statics for this expression. A numerical
analysis shows that for large s, it is always increasing in λ, while for small s it is
increasing in λ for small enough λ, but decreasing for larger λ. For example, Figure 2.1
gives p¯∗ as a function of λ for a number of values of s.
2.7 Extensions
2.7.1 An alternative reference point
We now consider the case where a consumer uses the distribution of match values at
firm i as a reference point, rather than the distribution of reference points that she may
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Figure 2.1: p¯∗ as a function of λ, for assorted values of s.
end up with. The adjusted match utility then equals
εL(εi) = εi − λM
∫ 1
i
(τ − εi)dF (τ),
as this is a disappointment relative to the higher values of εi that could have been
achieved. As the consumer no longer takes into account the posterior distribution that
she will end up with, the adjusted match value no longer depend on the reservation
utility ˆ, which greatly simplifies the analysis. We denote the distribution of adjusted
match values as G(ε).
Utility in the search and price dimensions are not affected relative to the analysis in
our main text. Hence, we still have
sL (s; ˆ) = s+ λSs (1− F (ˆ))
and
pL (pi; p
∗) = pi + λP (pi − p∗) 1{pi>p∗},
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(εL (ε)− εL (εi)) dF (ε) .
The reservation utility εˆ is now implicitly defined by
bL(εˆ) = s+ λSs (1− F (εˆ)) .
Derivation of the price equilibrium p∗ goes along the same lines as in the main analysis.
Define εˆL ≡ εL (εˆ) . Suppose that all other firms set price p∗, but i charges some
price pi. First consider downward defections from tentative equilibrium price p
∗
A, with
∆A ≡ pi − p∗A. Again, the consumer will stop searching whenever εiL ≥ εˆL + ∆A. With












Maximizing profits Π(pi; p
∗
A) = piDi(pi, p
∗











Now consider an upward deviation pi from tentative equilibrium price p
∗
B , with ∆B ≡
pi − p∗B . The consumer will now stop searching at firm i whenever εiL − pi − λP∆B ≥






















′ (ε)G (ε)n−1 dε
] .
Also in this case, we thus have p∗B = p
∗
A/ (1 + λP ) , and a continuum of Nash equilibria
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Comparative statics For comparative statics, we again assume infinitely many firms
and a uniform distribution of match values. Then
εL (ε) = ε− λM
∫ 1
ε
(τ − ε)dτ = ε− 1
2
λM (1− ε)2 .









dε = s+ λSs (1− εˆ) . (2.31)
In this case, it is rather impractical to find an explicit solution to εˆ, as it involves solving
a polynomial of the third-degree. With equal λ’s, we can show however that εˆ exists
and is strictly between 0 and 1.
Existence of εˆ Let’s look at the case of equal λ. Define
W (x) ≡ 1
6
(1− x)2(2λ(1− x) + 3)− s− λ(1− x)s. (2.32)
Hence (2.31) is satisfied if εˆ is a root of W (x). With s < 1/3, we have W (0) = 16 (2λ+
3)− s(1 + λ) > 0. Also, W (1) = −s < 0. Continuity then implies ∃x in [0, 1] such that
W (x) = 0. As W ′′ (x) = 2λ (1− x) + 1, W is strictly convex on [0, 1]. This implies that
W (x) = 0 has a unique solution on [0, 1].






Convexity of W (x) implies that it has a unique minimum x˜ on [0, 1]. Necessarily, εˆ ∈
[0, x˜] and W (x) < 0 for x ∈ [εˆ, 1]. Moreover W (1−√3s) = 12s > 0, hence εˆ > 1−
√
3s.
Since εˆ > 1−√3s we have ∂W∂λ (εˆ) = 13 (1−ε)3−(1−ε)s < 0 and ∂W/∂εˆ = −λ (1− x)2−
(1− x) + sλ < 0. This implies that dεˆ/dλ < 0, so more loss aversion here leads to more
search.
Equilibrium To solve the firms’ problem, first note
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Note that the lower bound of the support of G is given by εL (0) = − 12λM , while the
upper bound is εL(1) = 1. We thus have εL ∈
[− 12λM , 0] . The density g is given by
g (εL) =
1√





(1 + 2λM (1− εL))3/2 > 0.
We now have:
Proposition 2.5. When consumers use the entire distribution F (ε) as their reference











2λM (1− εˆL) + 1−
√








λM (1 + λP )
(
2λM (1− εˆL) + 1−
√
1 + 2λM (1− εˆL)
)
,
with εˆL = εˆ − 12λM (1− εˆ)2 , and εˆ implicitly defined by (2.31). The effect of loss
aversion on p∗A and p
∗
B is as follows:
a. An increase in loss aversion λ increases p∗A, while the effect on p
∗
B is ambiguous.
b. Loss aversion in the search and match dimensions increase p∗A, while loss aversion
in the price dimension has no effect on p∗A.
c. Loss aversion in the search and match dimensions increase p∗B, but loss aversion
in the price dimension decreases p∗B .






λ(1− ε)2 − x)dε− s− sλ(1− εˆ).
Note that the integral in Q (x) has a lower bound that is increasing in λ while the
integrand is decreasing in λ. It is immediate that the function εL(x) is decreasing in λ.
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−2λ2 ∂εˆL∂λ − λ
(1−εˆL)−λ ∂εˆL∂λ√
2λ(1−εˆL)+1
− 1 +√2λ(1− εˆL) + 1
λ2
.






1 + 2λ(1− εˆL) + λ2
]
+ λ(1− εˆL) + 1−
√
1 + 2λ(1− εˆL).
Since −2λ2√1 + 2λ(1− εˆL) + λ2 ≤ 0 the first term is positive. The sum of the other
terms also is. Hence
∂p∗A









The sign of the numerator is ambiguous.
Loss aversion in the search dimension leads to higher effective search costs, which leads
to higher equilibrium prices. It is immediate that p∗A decreases in λP but there is no







2λM (1− εˆL) + 1
×(









2λM (1− εˆL) + 1
)
.
This expression is clearly positive since λM (1 − εˆL) + 1 ≥
√
1 + 2λM (1− εˆL) and
∂εˆL
∂λM
≤ 0. Therefore ∂p∗A∂λM ≥ 0. The result for p∗B follows directly. 
Hence, the effect of loss aversion is comparable to that in the model in the main text;
the higher bound on prices increases while the effect on the lower bound is ambiguous.
The other comparative statics are also qualitatively the same as in our main analysis.




B are increasing in
s.
Finally, we consider the unique equilibrium price that satisfies our equilibrium refine-
ment in this context. We now have:
Proposition 2.6. The unique equilibrium price that survives our equilibrium refinement
is decreasing in λ.
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Proof. Along the exact same lines as in the main analysis, we have
p¯∗ =
1
λ (1 + λ/2)
(
2λ(1− εˆL) + 1−
√
1 + 2λ(1− εˆL)
)









− (2λK + 1−√1 + 2λK) (1 + λ)
λ2 (1 + λ/2)
2 .
The numerator can be written
1
2
2Kλ+ 3Kλ2 + 2 + 2λ− 2√2Kλ+ 1 (λ+Kλ2 + 1)√
2Kλ+ 1
.








2Kλ+ 3Kλ2 + 2 + 2λ
)2




which implies −Kλ2 (8K2λ3 + 11Kλ2 + 4Kλ+ 4λ+ 4 (1−K)) < 0 which is always
satisfied. 
2.7.2 Gain utility
In this section, we consider the case that γ > 0, so our consumer also experiences gain
utility. In line with psychological evidence, we assume γ < 1.
In the match dimension, the posterior distribution of match values is again given by











(τ − εi)dH(τ) + γλM
∫ εi
ˆ
(εi − τ)dH(τ) if εi ≥ ˆ (2.34)
as there are only pleasant surprises if εi > ˆ. We denote the resulting distribution Fγ .
In the price dimension, we now have
pL (pi; p
∗) = pi + λP (pi − p∗) 1{pi>p∗} − γλP (p∗ − pi) 1{pi<p∗}.
In the search dimension, again, with probability 1 − F (εˆ), the consumer expects not
to continue search, hence it is a disappointment if she does decide to search. However,
with probability F (εˆ) she does expect to search, and it is a pleasant surprise if she does
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not have to. But that implies that her utility, if she would not search, would now equal
γλSsF (εˆ). Hence, the opportunity costs of continuing search equal
sL = s+ λSs (1− F (εˆ)) + γλSsF (εˆ) . (2.35)
Surprisingly, gain utility does also act to increase effective search costs.
With these adjustments, a personal equilibrium is given by
bL(εˆ; εˆ) = sL + λSsL [1− F (εˆ)] ,
where bL (εi, ˆ) is again given by (2.11). Using the same analysis as in the main text,
there is now a continuum [p∗B , p
∗
A] of Nash equilibria, with
p∗A =
1− Fγ(εˆL)




p∗A(1 + γλP )
1 + λP
. (2.37)
With gain utility, the range of equilibria is thus smaller; the range collapses to a unique
equilibrium if γ → 1.15 The analysis concerning existence is very similar to the case of
γ = 0; also here, f ′ ≥ 0 and logconcavity of 1 − F are sufficient for these equilibria to
exist.
It is hard to find an explicit expression for the range of equilibrium prices, even in the
case of a uniform distribution of match values; solving for ˆ then involves solving a
third-degree polynomial. However, do note from the above that an increase in γ in the
search dimension leads to higher effective search costs, and hence to higher prices. An
increase in γ in the match dimension implies that the range of adjusted match values
becomes larger compared to a case with no gain utility, but with loss aversion. This
yields unambiguously higher prices. Finally, from (2.36) and (2.37) we immediately
have that an increase in γ in the price dimension leads to lower prices. Hence, the net
effect is ambiguous.
2.8 Conclusion
We considered a model in which consumers are loss averse and incur search cost to find
out the deals on offer by a firm on a market with differentiated products. Loss aversion
15In fact, it can be shown that in that case, the unique equilibrium coincides with that in the
standard model without gain-loss utility.
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then affects consumers through three channels: price, search costs, and match values.
In the price dimension, consumers are disappointed when they encounter a price that
is higher than expected. This leads to weakly lower prices. In the search dimension,
consumers may be disappointed when they have to search more often than expected.
This leads to unambiguously higher prices since it effectively increases search costs. In
the match-value dimension, consumers are disappointed if they do not like the product
as much as they could have. This leads to higher prices as, effectively, products become
more differentiated. Loss aversion yields more search when search costs are relatively
low, but less search when they are relatively high.
Taken together, the effect of loss aversion on prices is ambiguous. As is usual in these
models, we found a range of Nash equilibria. We proposed an equilibrium refinement
that effectively assumes that consumers make mistakes that are infinitesimally small.
The unique price that survives this refinement is decreasing in the extent of loss aversion
for intermediate search costs and relatively high loss aversion, and increasing otherwise.
In our base analysis we assumed that consumers take into account that in equilibrium
they end up with a match value higher than some lower bound. Any lower match value
will then be a disappointment. In an extension we studied the case where the entire








On many markets there are multiple suppliers who offer products which differ in several
dimensions and, in order to find the best offer, consumers will have to search. Consumers
can visits seller’s shops and websites randomly but nowadays, more often than not, they
rely on intermediating parties such as search engines and online marketplaces to obtain
advise on which seller is most likely to offer a product and deal to their liking. For
instance, if one wants to buy a new DVD, shopping websites suggest titles based on the
order history. When people are using an online search engine or comparison website
to find a product, they might enter not only the product name but also specify some
characteristics they like. It is clear that the internet offers the possibility to let the
search order depend upon one’s preferences. However, even in the absence of the world-
wide-web this has been and still is possible: a person looking to purchase a car with high
MPG will not start shopping at a car-dealer who mainly advertises SUV’s. Similarly,
an employee of a bookstore will not suggest to start looking in the comics section when
a consumer indicates that she likes classical literature.
This chapter provides several new insights when one does allows the listing order on
intermediating platforms, and therefore the search process of consumers, to depend on
consumer preferences. To model the role of the preferences in the listing and search
order, I assume that a product consists of so-called communicable and incommunicable
∗This chapter is based on Siekman (2015).
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horizontal characteristics. Consider, for instance, a consumer wanting to rent a house.
In order to find a suitable property she visits a platform on which she might indicate
that she has preferences for a house in close proximity to her her new workplace, this is
a communicable characteristics. Based upon this information the platform suggest the
real-estate agent at which the consumer is most likely to find the house that fits her
tastes the best. That is, the consumer is directed in her search for the best property.
The consumer in turn visits the website of suggested real-estate agent in order to find
out the price and inspect the product’s incommunicable characteristics, such as whether
the floorplan is convenient. She can then rent the house or decide to continue her search
until she does find an offer to her liking.
For simplicity this chapter assumes that only the first suggestion by the intermediating
platform depends upon the consumer’s preferences. This means that if the consumer
decides to continue her search, she will visit a random supplier’s website. I expect,
however, that my findings carry over to the more general framework the entire rank-
ing depends upon consumer characteristics. A justification for only allowing the first
suggestion to depend on the consumer’s tastes might be that this is profit maximizing
for the platform as this place becomes more valuable for a seller as it decreases the
expected value of continuing search for a consumer. I however do not model this side
of the market.
I find that prices and profits are higher in case of directed instead of random search. This
is because sellers exploit the fact that consumers first visit the seller with the highest
communicable attributes and are therefore less likely to visit a competitor. In effect,
products are ex-ante less homogeneous for consumers when product characteristics are
communicated.
This result is different than the one presented in Armstrong et al. (2009), which con-
siders a model similar model to mine, however, there a consumer’s preferences does not
affect which seller is visited first. In that model one seller is prominent and it is sampled
first by every consumer. I do not impose this a-symmetry on sellers. In Armstrong et
al. (2009) the prominent seller sets a lower price than in the case of random search as
it’s demand has become more elastic. The other sellers, on the other hand, face less
elastic demand and set a price above the one charged in the case of random search.
This chapter provides some interesting insights on the welfare effects of directed search
502107-L-bw-Siekman
3
Directed Consumer Search 43
as well. When product information affects the search order consumers obtain on average
a better match, as they start searching at the seller where they are most likely to find
the product that fits their tastes the best. Moreover, consumers are less likely to
continue search in each stage of the process. This is because they know that for certain
characteristics the product of the first seller is the best on the market. Hence, consumers
spend less on search costs. These two effects ensure that total welfare is higher under
directed search compared to random search. However, consumers turn out to be worse
off as these two effects are outweighed by the higher prices they pay.
Again the difference in results with Armstrong et al. (2009) is worth noting. They
also find that consumers search less, although for a different reason. In their model
a consumer is more likely to buy at the first seller because it sets a lower price than
the competition. This induces some consumers not to search beyond the first seller
although it would be socially efficient. This means that on average consumers obtain a
lower match value than in case of random search. Hence, opposite to me they find that
non-random search leads to lower total welfare.
This observation leads to a conclusion that is opposite to that in Armstrong et al. (2009)
as well. Suppose there is a profit maximizing platform that provides a link between
consumers and sellers. If the platform is able to extract total welfare by charging both
consumers and sellers, it will have an incentive for different groups of consumers to
suggest different sellers based upon the consumer’s preferences.
My model extends the seminal work of Anderson and Renault (1999). In that article
consumers visit sellers in a random order, by introducing communicable characteristics
I allow consumer preferences to influence the search order. When, in my framework,
a product only consists of incommunicable characteristics consumers search at random
and the model of Anderson and Renault (1999) results. However, when all product
characteristics are used to determine which seller is visited first the Diamond (1971)
paradox emerges. The result in Anderson and Renault (1999) that prices are non-
decreasing in search costs carries over to my work.
My findings contribute to the literature on consumer search with differentiated prod-
ucts, which is built around the classic papers by Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and
Renault (1999). These and subsequent works often assume totally random search by
consumers amongst sellers. However, besides the already discussed Armstrong et al.
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(2009), there are some notable exceptions. Arbatskaya (2007) considers a market with
homogeneous products where consumers face heterogeneous search costs and search in
an exogenously given order. Sellers have knowledge about this search order, and they
charge higher prices when they are visited in an early stage. In the work of Zhou (2011)
consumers also search in a fixed order, however, products are horizontally differentiated.
He finds that prices increase in the search order, since sellers visited in a later stage
exploit the fact that consumers who sample them must have relatively low valuations
for the offered product of earlier sampled sellers. Other literature in which the search
order is non-random includes Wilson (2010), who considers a homogeneous good mar-
ket in which seller’s search costs are endogenized. Sellers can obfuscate, which makes it
more time-consuming for consumers to inspect a product and learn its price. In equi-
librium Wilson finds that consumers are more likely to visit a seller with low search
costs. A similar approach is taken by Ellison and Wolitzky (2013), but they assume
consumers can not observe the level of obfuscation prior to arrival. In the empirical
work of Hortac¸su and Syverson (2004) the sampling probability of a seller is proxied
by advertising expenditures. The work by Haan and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2011) takes a
different approach. They consider a consumer search model in which consumers first
visit the seller whose advertising is most salient. Finally Haan et al. (2015) consider
a duopoly in a similar setting as my framework. However, they focus on the case that
information on prices are disclosed. Hence, while there model is more relevant in mod-
eling how advertisements affects the search order, mine is more suitable to analyze the
effect of permutations amongst the results of a search engine.
My work connects to the literature on position auctions as well. Influential works in
this fields are fore instance Athey and Ellison (2011) and Chen and He (2011). In their
models sellers differ in the likelihood that they can meet the ’need’ that a consumer has.
These models analyze how the platform can maximize profits by auctioning prominent
positions to sellers but abstract away from the relation between consumers and sellers.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model.
In section 3.3 equilibrium prices are derived. Section 3.4 presents the benchmark model.
Comparative statics are discussed in section 3.5. In section 3.6 I conduct a welfare-
analysis. Section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 The model
I consider a market with n ≥ 2 sellers selling horizontally differentiated products. Sellers
face constant marginal costs, which I normalize to zero. Demand is assumed to be
inelastic. Without loss of generality the market size is normalized to 1. A consumer
buying from seller i ∈ {1, . . . , n} receives utility
ui = (1− λ)εi + λvi − pi,
with λ ∈ [0.1]. Here pi is the price charged. (1−λ)εi+λvi is the stochastic match value
between a consumer and product i. Match values are independently distributed across
products, moreover, I assume εi and vi are independently distributed random variables.
εi is the realization of a distribution F and is referred to as the Incommunicable Part
of the Match Value, IPMV henceforth. vi is the realization of a distribution H and is
referred to as the Communicable Part of the Match Value, CPMV from now on. The
total stochastic match value, denoted by ti = (1− λ)εi + λvi, has a distribution which
is the weighted convolution of F and H, which is denoted by M . Let f , h and m be the
densities associated with F , H and M , respectively. f and h are taken to be continuous.
[aF , bF ] and [aH , bH ] respectively denote the supports of F and H on the extended real
line. Let the bounds on ti be denoted by
a = (1− λ)aF + λaH and b = (1− λ)bF + λbH .
Sellers can not discriminate in prices as they are unable to observe match values. In or-
der to find the best combination of match value and price amongst the sellers consumers
visit a platform such as a search engine or a price comparison website. On that platform
links to sellers are presented, and the consumer can sequaentially search amongst the
sellers with perfect recall and agains search costs s. The links on the platform may
be ordered in two ways. First, sellers may presented in a random order which does
not convey any information to the consumer. Consumers will then randomly search
amongst the sellers, this is the benchmark. Second, the seller with highest OPMV for a
consumer may be listed first and all other sellers are listed below it in a random order.
Such an order conveys some match information which consumers can use in their search
process. I will show that it is actually optimal for consumers to first visit the first listed
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seller. This ordening will be refered to as directed search, and below the search process
is described in more detail.
Stage 1 Consumers arrive at the platform and communicate some of their preferences.
One might imagine consumers looking to rent a house. Consumers might have
strong preferences for a certain location because of the proximity to their work-
place. A consumer indicates to the platform that she is looking for a house at a
particular location, this is the communicable characteristic of the product. The
platform then presents a list of sellers, with at the top the seller with a house at
or closest to the desired location. Hence, the CPMV is the distance to the desired
location.
Stage 2 Subsequently the consumer visits the website of the suggested seller and learns
about the price and the total match value, inlcuding the IPMV. The consumer
takes this into account when calculating the expected benefit of continuing search,
which she compares to the costs of doing so. A high price and/or a low IPMV
at the first seller might give a strong reason to continue the search for a better
deal. If the consumer’s search costs are higher than the expected benefit of search
she will buy at the current supplier, otherwise the consumer continues her search
by visiting another website listed at the platform.2 In calculating the expected
benefit of searching, the consumer incorporates the fact that for any other product
the CPMV is smaller than at the first seller. The IPMV in the example where
the consumer is looking for a house might be the floorplan of the house. If a
consumer dislikes the house’s layout she might still want to look at other options
on the market, although she knows that these are further away from the desired
location.
Notice that the directed search rule is a generalization of the one presented in the
standard consumer search models, see for instance Anderson and Renault (1999). In
those models, consumers search completely at random without using any match in-
formation. The assumption of not using this information is relaxed in our model by
2Note that ordening at the platform beyond the first seller is random. Future research might look
into the possibility of allowing this order to depend on the CPMV as well. In such a model the consumer
faces, in each stage, a different expected benefit of continuing search, depending on the CPMV of the
next best seller. This complicates the model severely.
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allowing consumers to determine the first seller they visit based on the suggestion of an
intermediating platform
It is important to realize that for a certain consumer each seller has a probility of 1/n
of being listed first, depending on the realization of the IPMV. This in contrast to
the models in Armstrong et al. (2009) and Rhodes (2011) where one seller is always
prominent for all consumers for some exogenous reason.
3.3 The pricing Nash equilibrium
In this section I derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium in prices. As I look for a symmetric
Nash equilibrium, I need to consider the best response of seller i ∈ {1, . . . , n} when all
other sellers set some price p∗. Setting p∗ should be optimal for seller i as well. Below
I derive the demand and profit function for seller i.
Consider a consumer before entering the market. She gets informed about which seller
has vm = maxj∈{1,...,n}{vj}, the highest CPMV, and she visits this seller first. Suppose
a consumer has decided to visit seller i first: vm = vi. If she decides to buy from seller
i she will receive an utility of (1−λ)εi+λvi−pi. If she continues search and buys from
seller j she receives (1−λ)εj +λvj−p∗. Define ∆ = pi−p∗ and x ≡ (1−λ)εi+λvi−∆.
When the consumer arrives at seller i she learns x. The consumer is better off at seller
j when tj > x. The expected benefit of continuing searching (net of search costs) from
seller i is thus given by:






((1− λ)εj + λvj − x)f(εj)dεj h(vj)
H(vm)
dvj .
Notice that the consumer does take into account that she has already visited the seller
with CPMV vm and therefore the CPMV’s for the remaining seller will be lower. This
is why the conditional density h(vj)/H(vm) figures in this expression.
g(x, vm) is strictly decreasing in x and goes from +∞ to zero as x goes from −∞ to
+∞. Let xˆ be implicitly defined by g(xˆ, vm) = s, which exists and is unique for each
vm given the above and s ∈ (0,∞). It follows that for a consumer it is beneficial
to continue search if the total match value at a seller is lower than xˆ. Notice that xˆ
depends on vm, moreover, the random search model a` la Anderson and Renault (1999)
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is obtained when vm is replaced by bH in g(x, vm) or when λ = 0. In addition, as s > 0,
xˆ < (1− λ)bF + λvm.
I now derive demand for seller i. As I am considering a symmetric Nash equilibrium, the
consumer expects that every seller is charging price p∗, and does not anticipate seller
i charging pi. Suppose vi = vm, so a consumer arrives at seller i first. This consumer
does not continue her search and buys from i whenever (1 − λ)εi + λvm > xˆ. This





. The probability that the
seller i has the highest CPMV on the market is H(vm)
n−1. Therefore, the fraction of
the population arriving at i first and staying there to buy can be found by multiplying















Now suppose seller i is visited as lth seller, l ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Let the subscripts of the
CPMV and IPMV denote the order in which sellers are visited. In this scenario the
consumer must have visited first a seller with CPMV vm and she must have rejected






sequently the consumer must have visited sellers 2 up till and including l − 1 and also
rejected their offers, implying that (1 − λ)εj + λvj < xˆ for j ∈ {2, . . . , l − 1}. The










When the consumer arrives after l − 1 sellers at seller i she should buy there. Hence,











These probabilities already impose that vj < vm for j ∈ {2, . . . , l − 1}.and vi < vm.
However, we also need that vj < vm for the sellers the consumer does not visit, which is
captured by the factor H(vm)
n−l. By taking these factors into account, weighing them
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with the density of vm, and by integrating over vm one finds that the probability that























In addition there are consumers who buy from seller i after they initially rejected its
offer and visited all sellers. The term comebacks will be used for these consumers. First
consider consumers who visited seller i first (vi = maxj∈{1,...,n}{vj}) and return there






. Therefore, we find that demand for seller i

















where the upperbound on the second integral ensures that initially the consumer contin-
ued search from seller i. Now consider consumers who visit i as seller l ∈ {2, . . . , n}, so
vi < vm, and buys there after considering all the other offers on the market. Similarly
as above, we find that this happens with probability:
Y 2(pi, p























It follows that total demand for seller i charging pi, given all other sellers charge p
∗, is:
DD(pi, p




∗) + Y 1(pi, p∗) + Y 2(pi, p∗). (3.3)
Profits of seller i are then given by
Π(pi, p
∗) = piDD(pi; p∗). (3.4)
Proposition 3.1. Let f and h be continuously differentiable densities on the supports
[aF , bF ] and [aH , bH ]. Furthermore, let 0 < s < E(ti) − a. When the symmetric Nash
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with equilibrium profits Π∗ = p
∗
n . A sufficient condition for existence of the equilibrium
is f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε. In the case of λ = 1 or s ≥ E(ti)− a, sellers charge infinite prices in
equilibrium.
It is necessary that s > 0, otherwise consumers search freely, and a situation of perfect
information occurs in which prices will drop to zero. The condition s < E(ti) − a is
imposed to ensure that there is search on the market. If this requirement would not
be met, search cost would be so high that it is unbeneficial for consumers to search
onward if all sellers charge the same price, even if the match value at the current seller
is the worst possible. Anderson and Renault (1999) already pointed to the similarity
of this setting to that of Diamond (1971): for any price set by the competitors, a seller
can increase its price without affecting its demand. Hence, in equilibrium all sellers set
infinite prices. I find that this situation is analogous to that of the case of λ = 1under
the directed search regime.
Equation (3.5) is found by equating the derivative of (3.4) at p∗ to zero. The remainder
of the proof that (3.5) gives a global maximum when f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε is presented in
Appendix 3.A. The Diamond-type argument that prices and profits go to infinity when
s ≥ E(ti)− a is trivial and is omitted.
The condition f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε is satisfied by the uniform distribution, and more generally
for any distribution F (ε) = εκ with κ ≥ 1. Establishing the existence of equilibrium
for the somewhat more general conditions given by Anderson and Renault (1999) is not
my central concern. This chapter’s aim is to quantify the value of information.
Note that the Proposition does not treat the case λ = 0. In that case consumers do
not value the CPMV and basing their search order upon it makes no sense. The model
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3.4 Benchmark
I now derive equilibrium prices under the assumption of random search. The price in
the symmetric Nash equilibrium under this scenario is denoted by pr. The demand of
seller i under the random search rule can be derived similar fashion as above and in
the expression below, where ∆r = pi− pr, it is presented. More details can be found in
















































as R(x¯, bH) = M(x¯). Here x¯ solves g(x, bH) = s. Since s > 0, x¯ < b.





Proposition 3.2. Let f and h be continuously differentiable densities on the supports
[aF , bF ] and [aH , bH ]. Furthermore, let 0 < s < E(ti) − a. When the symmetric Nash








with equilibrium profits Π∗r = p
r
n . A sufficient condition for existence is of the equi-
librium is f ′(εi) ≥ 0. In the case of s ≥ E(ti) − a, sellers charge infinite prices in
equilibrium.
A proof of this Proposition can be found in Anderson and Renault (1999).
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3.5 Comparative statics
Due to the complexity of the model I restrict attention to standard uniformly distributed
CPMV and IPMV and 2 sellers in the remainder of this section. Moreover, I assume λ ∈
(0, 0.5] and that search costs are sufficiently small: s ≤ 1−λ8 . This last condition ensures
that there will be no consumers who refrain from searching beyond the first sampled
seller even before they know the realization of the IPMV. Appendix 3.B includes a






(pr, pr) are derived explicitly for uniformly distributed match values and 2 sellers.
Using these Lemma’s and numerical methods the following set of Propositions is derived.
Proposition 3.3. p∗ ≥ pr.
The Proposition states that sellers charge higher prices when consumers use directed
instead of random search. Under directed search consumers will first visit the seller that
offers the product with the highest expected utility, which reduces demand elasticity.
This results is opposite to the effect of prominence is Armstrong et al. (2009). There
the prominent seller sets a lower price than in the case of random search because it
faces more elastic demand as all consumers sample it first. Moreover, in my model
sellers are symmetric, leading to equal prices, while in Armstrong et al. (2009) non-
prominent sellers set a price higher than under random search, and therfore higher than
the prominent seller’s price.
One interpretation of the Proposition is that disclosing product’s horizontal attributes
leads to higher prices. This is also found Meurer and Stahl (1994) and Anderson
and Renault (2009), although in different settings. These papers consider buyers who
observe prices and are not able to search for the best product match. However, some
consumers might be informed about product characteristics through advertising, which
leads to higher prices.
Proposition 3.4. The equilibrium price p∗ is non-decreasing in search costs.
The intuition behind this result is that when search costs are higher it is more costly
for consumers to inspect the option at the next seller. Sellers know that consumers are
thus less likely to continue searching and will charge a higher price. For the equilibrium
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price under random search, pr, a similar result can be established, see Anderson and
Renault (1999).
Proposition 3.5.
(a) p∗ is decreasing in the CPMV weight λ if s < s˜, where s˜ is a function of λ.
(b) p∗ is increasing in λ if s > s˜.
This Proposition is the result of two mechanisms which work in opposite directions.
To see this, first consider the impact of λ upon the prices under random search, pr.
A change in λ does not effect the search decision of consumers directly, as they search
random. However, the change does affect the distribution of the total match value,
ti = (1 − λ)εi + λvi. An increase in λ ∈ (0, 0.5) leads to a lower variance of ti, but
leaves its expected value unaffected. A lower variation in the total match value means
less product differentation. As Anderson and Renault (1999) shows, less differentiation
leads to less monopoly power for sellers and thus lower prices. Under directed search
an increase of λ has the additional effect that consumers are better informed: for a
larger part of the match value they know that the first seller they visit offers the best
option. Hence, the expected return from searching decreases in λ in that case and leads
to upward pressure on prices. This effect only dominates the other effect when search
costs are sufficiently large. After all, when search costs are small consumers are likely
to search onward, even if the weight on the CPMV is increased.
The discussion above shows that λ can not directly be interpreted as the amount of
product information made available to consumers, as a change of it alters the distribu-
tion of the match value as well. Hence, λ should be fixed and the CPMV might be used
to determine the search order or not.
Corollary 3.1. Π∗ ≥ Π∗r.
Proof of Corollary 3.1. All sellers have an equal market share (1/2) in each equilib-
rium, as they charge the same price as their competitor, whether search is random or
when it depends on the OPMV. The result now follows, since p∗ ≥ pr by Proposition
3.3. 
The Propositions in this section are established for uniformly distributed match values
and a duopoly. Model complexity prevents me to generalize these results or establish
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them analytically. However, I do allow for more general distributions and more than 2
sellers when analyzing the welfare effects of product information in the next section.
3.6 Welfare
Throughout this section I assume that λ 6= 0 and s > 0. It is convenient to define
tmi = (1− λ)εi + λvm, with vm ≥ vj ∀j.
Proposition 3.6. Consumers search strictly less under directed search than under ran-
dom search as in each stage of the search process the consumers is less likely to continue
search.
Proof of Proposition 3.6. First consider the decision whether to continue search
when a consumer has already arrived at at least two sellers. Recall ti = (1−λ)εi +λvi.
Notice that the maximum of n − 1 independent random variables with distribution H
has (n − 1)H(vm)n−2h(vm) as its probability density function. Under directed search











In Appendix 3.A it is shown that xˆ ≤ x¯ for all vm, therefore it follows that this



















which is exactly the probability of continuing search under random search. Hence, under
directed search the consumer who has already left the first seller continues searching at
most as often as in the random search regime.
Now consider the probability of searching under in the different settings when a con-
sumer has arrived at the first seller. In the random search case one has a match value
of ti while under the directed regime one has a match value t
m
i . Straightforwardly, one
obtains Pr[ti ≤ x¯] ≥ Pr[tmi ≤ x¯] ≥ Pr[tmi ≤ xˆ]. The first inequality holds strictly if
vi 6= vm. So, a consumer under the directed regime is less likely to continue search
from the first firm than under the random search rule. Therefore, expected search
expenditures are strictly lower under the directed regime. 
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Proposition 3.7. The expected total match value a consumer obtains under directed
search is higher than under random search.
Proof of Proposition 3.7. The possibility of consumers returning to a seller after
visiting all sellers is irrelevant for the analysis. When such an event happens, the
expected match value a consumer obtains is the same in case of random and directed
search because she can choose from the same set of sellers. Let vm, the highest CPMV
on the market, be fixed. Define
Z = λvm + E[(1− λ)εj ] and W = E[λvi + (1− λ)εi|vi < vm].
Z is the expected match value of the seller with the highest CPMV, say seller j. W
is the expected match value at the other sellers. Notice that Z ≥ W . The likelihood
of a consumer arriving at seller j equals 1 in case of directed search, as this seller
will be sampled first. Under random search it is strictly lower as a consumer might
sample another seller first and buy there. To show that the expected match value
under directed search is higher it thus suffices to show that consumers are less likely
to continue search from seller j. Under random search this happens with probability
Pr[tmj ≤ x¯] as consumers do not realize this is the seller with the highest CPMV. Under
consumer-dependent prominece it is lower and equals Pr[tmj ≤ xˆ]. 
For an individual consumer it is optimal to minimize the search costs and maximize
the expected match value. In both cases directed search outperforms random search,
implying that this will be the strategy followed by consumers.
It is informative to compare the above results to those in Armstrong et al. (2009). They
find that consumers also search less compared to the case of random search, although
for a different reason. In their model a consumer is more likely to buy at the first seller
because it charges a lower price than its rivals while in my model she is more likely to
do so because the match value is on average higher. In their framework a consumer
obtains on average a lower match value than when she would search randomly because
the lower price at the first seller induces some consumers not to continue searching
although it would be socially efficient. In my model the preferences of a consumer
affect which seller is visited first, which actually leads to the opposite effect of higher
expected match value in equilibrium.
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As prices are merely transfers in a covered market, total welfare is higher under directed
search than under random search.3
Corollary 3.2. Total welfare under directed search is higher than under random search.
This finding is opposite to that in Armstrong et al. (2009) where total welfare is lower
than in the case where consumers visit sellers in a random order. The reason is that
in my model consumers are better matched to sellers than under random search while
in their model the matching is equally bad and consumers search less than what is
socially efficient. This observataion leads to a conclusion that is opposite to that in
Armstrong et al (2009) as well. Suppose there is a profit maximizing platform that
provides a link between consumers and sellers. If the platform is able to extract total
welfare by charging both consumers and sellers, it will have an incentive to introduce
direct consumers based upon their preferences.
Having considered total welfare and profits I now turn to consumer welfare. I derive
an expression for the expected match value and search expenditures under directed and
random search. I start with directed search. Notice that nH(vm)
n−1 is the density
of the maximum of n CPMV’s and (n − 1)H(vm)n−2 that of the maximum of n − 1
CPMV’s. Hence, the expected match from buying at the first seller equals












while the expected match from buying directly from the lth visited seller, l ∈ {2, . . . , n},
equals









1− F ( xˆ−λv1−λ )
h(v)(n− 1)H(vm)n−2h(vm)dεdvdvm.
When a consumer returns to an earlier visited seller her expected match is the ex-
pectation of the maximum of n match values. By considering first the case that
maxi=1,...n{ti} 6= tm and then the case that maxi=1,...n{ti} = tm we find that this
3If the model would allow for nonpurchase than the higher equilibrium prices under directed search
might possibly offset the positive effects of lower search cost and higher expected match values and lead
to a welfare loss. However, when search costs are sufficiently small or when there is not much product
differentiation, prices will approach those of perfect competition and the market will be covered.
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ensure ti ≥ tj .
There are nQ1(p
∗, p∗) consumers who buy from the first seller they arrive at. Here
Q1(p
∗, p∗) is given in equation (3.1), this term is multiplied with n as there are n
sellers active who can have the highest CPMV for a consumer. Similarly, the number of
consumers buying from seller l ∈ {2, . . . , n} without having visited it before is given by
(n−l+1)Ql(p∗, p∗), where Ql(p∗, p∗) is given in (3.2). Finally, the number of comebacks
on the market is given by










Using these expressions I find that total welfare under random search is given by
SWD = nQ1(p
∗, p∗)[−s+ E(tmi |tmi > xˆ)] +
n∑
l=2
(n− l + 1)Ql(p∗, p∗)[−ls+ E(ti|ti > xˆ)]





















∣∣∣∣ti < x¯)] .
Corollary 3.2 established that SWD > SWR. However, Proposition 3.3 shows that
p∗ ≥ pr. So, on the one hand, consumers pay higher prices under directed search, but
on the other hand, they obtain a higher match values and spend less on search costs. I
evaluate SWD − p∗ − (SWR − pr) to determine whether consumers are worse off under
502107-L-bw-Siekman
3
58 Search and Switching Costs
directed search. I apply numerical methods due to the complexity of the expression.
Again I will restrict attention to sufficiently small search costs, uniformly distributed
CPMV’s and IPMV’s, λ ∈ (0, 0.5] and n = 2. Appendix 3.B presents for this setting
∂DD
∂pi
(p∗, p∗) and ∂D
r
∂pi
(pr, pr) from which p∗ and pr directly follow. I find the following
result.
Proposition 3.8. Consumer surplus under directed search is lower than under random
search.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter I incorporated the idea that an intermediating platform between con-
sumers and sellers may base the order in which the sellers are listed on the preferences
of a consumer. Based on this order consumers first sample the seller where they expect
to find the product that gives them the highest utility. The model fits into the literature
on consumer search with differentiated products and contributes to the literature on
position auctions as well.
Under directed search I find that prices and profits are higher as compared to the
case of random search. The driving force behind this result is that sellers realize that
consumers will first sample the seller at which they expect to find the product that
fits their tastes the best. This gives them some monopoly power over these consumers,
which is exploited in equilibrium. Disclosing product information through the platform
effectively allows sellers to differentiate their products and charge higher prices. In line
with existing literature I find that prices are increasing in search costs, as higher search
costs reduce demand elasticity. In the extreme case when all product characteristics
are displayed on the platform the Diamond paradox arises again.
Total welfare is higher under directed search than in case of random search. This is the
result of two effects. First, consumers obtain on average a higher match value because
they start their search at a seller which offers a product that, in certain dimensions,
fits their tastes the best. Second, consumers are less likely to search onward in each
stage of the process when their preferences influences which seller to sample first. This
is because consumers know they will never find a product that fits their preferences
better for certain aspects than the one offered by the first seller. One implication of
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this result is that when a profit maximizing platform is able to extract total welfare by
charging both consumers and sellers, it will have an incentive to suggest sellers based
upon consumer preferences.
Consumer welfare turns out to be lower under directed search, as the positive effects of
better matches and lower search expenditures are outweighed by the higher prices.
Future research might extend the presented model and allow the entire listing order to
depend upon consumer preferences. Such an extension is far from trivial since it takes
away the stationary character of the search process as the expected benefit of continuing
search will then depend upon the available product information of the next best seller.
3.A General distributions
First I give a useful Lemma and its proof.






((1−λ)εj +λvj −x)f(εj)dεj h(vj)H(vm)dvj is decreasing in
x and increasing in vm. In addition, xˆ ≤ x¯ where xˆ solves g(x, vm) = s and x¯ solves
g(x, b) = s.
Proof of Lemma 1. By inspecting the expression of g(x, vm) it immediately follows





































g(x, vm) is increasing in vm. Combining these results gives xˆ ≤ x¯. 
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Proof of Proposition 3.1. I show that profit function is concave for λ ∈ (0, 1), the
case λ = 1 will be treated later. Define
ui = εi − ∆
1− λ and Θ =
{








































































































































xˆ− λvi + ∆
1− λ
))
5Start the computation with the first term after the equality sign. Apply integration by parts on the
inner integral of this expression. That is, calculate
∫
Θ α(ui)β




1−λ )β(aF − ∆1−λ ) −
∫
Θ β(ui)α





















. Bringing the term
∫
Θ β(ui)α
′(ui)dui to the other side of the equality
sign then gives the result. In Anderson and Renault (1999) a similar approach is used to calculate
DA(pi, p
∗) and DB(pi, p∗) at page 733.
6Use the same approach as in footnote 5.
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1− λ, vi, vm
)]
h(vi)dvih(vj)dvm. (3.13)























































































































































It follows that every term in (3.14), and therefore demand, is non-increasing in pi.
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Let pik(pi, p





∗)h(vm)dvm. I show pik(pi, p∗) is concave for all k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
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All terms in the expression are non-positive since f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε, which leads to the
conclusion that pi4(pi, p
∗) is concave.
Because the sum of concave functions is concave it follows by these arguments that a
sufficient condition for the symmetric Nash equilibrium to exists is f ′(ε) ≥ 0 ∀ε when
λ ∈ (0, 1).
Now suppose λ = 1. Then consumers perfectly observe the entire match value in the
first stage of the game, and the IPMV is zero. However, they still have to search for
the best price. An argument that is analogous to that of Diamond shows that the best
response to any market price is an increase of the price. Prices will explode under the
covered market assumption. 
3.B Uniformly distributed match values
To derive an explicit expressions for ∂D
D
∂pi
(p∗, p∗) and ∂D
r
∂pi
(pr, pr) it is convenient to
write out the density of a convex combination of two uniformly distributed variables.
The convolution of two uniform distributions. Let X and Y be uniformly dis-
tributed on [0, bF ] and [0, bH ], respectively. The density of Z = λY +(1−λ)X, denoted
by m, is given by:
m(z) =

0 if z ≤ 0
z
λbH(1−λ)bF if z ∈ (0,min{λbH , (1− λ)bF }]
min{λbH ,(1−λ)bF }
λbH(1−λ)bF if z ∈ [min{λbH , (1− λ)bF ,max{λbH , (1− λ)bF }]
λbH+(1−λ)bF−z
λbH(1−λ)bF if z ∈ [max{λbH , (1− λ)bF }, λbH + (1− λ)bF )
0 if z ≥ λbH + (1− λ)bF .
Moreover, the following Lemma will be useful.
Lemma 2. For uniformly distributed match values and λ ∈ (0, 0.5] the following state-
ments hold.
(a) When s ∈ [ λ2v2m6(1−λ) , 1−λ8 ] then xˆ = 1− λ+ 12λvm −
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12 .
(b) When s ∈ [ λ26(1−λ) , 1−λ8 ] then x¯ = 1− 12λ−
√
2(1− λ)s− λ212 .
(c) When s <
λ2v2m
6(1−λ) then xˆ = 1− λ+ λvm − (6vmλ(1− λ)s)1/3.
(d) When s < λ
2
6(1−λ) then x¯ = 1− (6λ(1− λ)s)1/3.
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When s < 1−λ8 then xˆ ≥ λvm for all vm and the decision to continue search will depend
upon the realization of a consumer’s IPMV.


















λ2v2m − 3λvmx− 3λ2vm + 3λvm + 3x2 + 6λx− 6x+ 3λ2 − 6λ+ 3
)
.
Equating this to s and solving for x gives xˆ = 1− λ+ 12λvm −
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12 . As
xˆ ≤ 1− λ this puts the condition s ≥ λ2v2m6(1−λ) on s. However, when s is sufficiently large
it might happen that 1 − λ + 12λvm −
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12 < λvm for sufficiently small
vm, contradicting xˆ ≥ λvm. In that case there are some consumers who will decide
not to continue search based upon their CPMV, independent of their IPMV. I assume
s ≤ 1−λ8 to keep the model tractable. The expression for x¯ and the conditions imposed
on s for case (b) are found by taking vm = 1 in part (a).





(1− λ+ λvj − x)2
2(1− λ)vm dvj =
(1− λ+ λvm − x)3
6vmλ(1− λ) .
Solving g(xˆ, vm) = s gives xˆ = 1−λ+λvm− (6vmλ(1−λ)s)1/3. Setting vm = 1 in this
expression gives x¯. The conditions on s for this case now straightforwardly follow. 
The following Lemma gives explicit versions of ∂D
D
∂pi




Lemma 3. Let vˇ = 1λ
√
6(1− λ)s. For uniformly distributed match values, s ≤ 1−λ8
and λ ∈ (0, 0.5] the following statements hold.














4vm − 2− 3λvm + 2λ− 3λv2m − 2(2vm − 1)
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12
2(1− λ)2 dvm. (3.17)
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4vm − 2− 3λvm + 2λ− 3λv2m − 2(2vm − 1)
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12
2(1− λ)2 dvm. (3.18)
(c) When s ≤ min{ 1−λ8 , λ
2
6(1−λ)}, then x¯ = 1− (6λ(1− λ)s)1/3 and
∂Dr
∂pi
(pr, pr) = − x¯
3 − 3x¯2 + 3x¯− 16λ3 + 12λ2 − 1
12λ2(1− λ)2 . (3.19)







, then x¯ = 1− 12λ−
√
2(1− λ)s− λ212 and
∂Dr
∂pi
(pr, pr) = −6(1 + x¯)− 11λ
12(1− λ)2 . (3.20)
Proof of Lemma 3. By Lemma 2 xˆ = 1 − λ + λvm − (6vmλ(1 − λ)s)1/3 for vm ≥ vˇ
and xˆ = 1 − λ + 12λvm −
√
2(1− λ)s− λ2v2m12 for vm < vˇ. First assume vˇ ≤ 1, that is,
s ≤ λ26(1−λ) .

























































For n = 2 and uniformly distributed match values the derivative of the last four lines












































































































































Adding (3.23) to (3.22) and some algebra leads to the expression given in part (a) of
the Lemma. Part (b) can be derived in a similar fashion and by noticing that vˇ > 1
when s > λ
2
6(1−λ) .

























First suppose s > λ
2












1−λ for all vi, vj ∈ [0, 1]. When one uses m(ti) for the uniform distributions given at
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Combining these findings with (3.24) and Lemma 2 results in part (d) of the Lemma.





















2λ(1−λ) . Furthermore, using m(ti) as given
















Winning back the unfaithful while exploiting the loyal:
Retention offers and heterogeneous switching costs∗
4.1 Introduction
In subscription-type markets, e.g. those for credit cards, cable, telecom, and insurance,
firms are often willing to offer a better deal to consumers who indicate that they want to
cancel their subscription. These offers are known as retention offers, as firms make them
in an attempt to retain fickle consumers. Consumers’ reactions to these practices differ.
Some seem largely unaware of it, or at least unwilling to exploit such offers. Others
actively chase them, sharing details of current offers on websites like flyertalk.com.
In this chapter, we analyze retention offers. We assume that there are two types of
consumers; those with relatively low, and those with relatively high switching costs.
Firms can use retention offers to screen consumers with low switching costs. Consumers
that have already gone through the trouble of obtaining an offer from a competing firm,
signal that they have low switching costs and hence are likely to switch. Retention offers
then effectively serve as a mechanism to price discriminate against consumers with high
switching costs.
We thus focus on cases where consumers cancel their current subscription in favor of
a competitor. For example, in the UK, Ofcom (2010) reports that in e.g. mobile
telephony, consumers that want to switch have to contact their current provider and
∗This chapter is based on Haan and Siekman (2015b).
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request a code which they must communicate to their new provider to complete the
switch. However, when applying for such a code, the current provider can, and often
does, make a retention offer. Indeed, this chapter was inspired by a similar experience.
One of the authors who switched to a cheaper car insurance still received a renewal from
the old insurer. He phoned them, the company apologized, asked why he cancelled his
policy, and what price the new insurer charged. It then offered a price slightly below
that – which he was willing to accept. It is exactly this experience that we try to model
in this chapter.
We study a two-period model with two firms located at the endpoints of a Hotelling
line. In the second period, firms set prices based on buying behavior in period 1. In
particular, firm B can try to poach consumers from firm A by charging them a lower
price. Once a consumer indicates that she intends to switch from A to B to take
advantage of that poaching price, however, firm A can make a retention offer. In the
equilibrium of our model, low-switching-cost consumers strategically solicit offers from
the competing firm to secure a retention offer from their current provider – even if they
have no intention to switch. Soliciting offers requires costly effort, and high-switching-
cost consumers do not find making that effort worthwhile. Hence, using retention offers
allows firms to price discriminate between the two types.
We find that the possibility of retention offers increases prices. Prices for loyal consumers
increase, as this pool of consumers is less likely to switch on average. But poaching prices
increase as well; as low-cost consumers have already incurred part of their switching
costs, they become easier to poach. Equilibrium prices in the first period also increase.
As competition for consumers with low switching costs is fiercer in the second period,
firms are less eager to attract these consumers in period 1. The welfare effects are
ambiguous. Firms are better off, while consumers are worse off. The latter applies to
all individual high-switching-cost consumers, and to consumers as a whole. The effect
on individual low-cost consumers is ambiguous.
This chapter clearly fits in the literature on behavior-based price discrimination. Classic
references in this field include Chen (1997), Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) and Taylor
(2003), that all look at multi-period models in which firms can base the price they charge
on a consumer’s purchase history. Chen and Pearcy (2010) allow consumer tastes to




effects of behavior-based price discrimination in the context of entry deterrence. Yet,
none of these papers allows for retention offers. This chapter adds to the literature on
switching costs, of which overviews can be found in Klemperer (1995) and Farrell and
Klemperer (2007).
Two recent papers, developed independently from this chapter, do look at retention
offers. Gnutzmann (2013) extends Chen (1997) by looking at retention offers in a
model with homogeneous products and N ≥ 2 firms. In the second period, consumers
can readily observe loyalty prices, poaching prices and retention prices, but have to
exert effort 1 to secure the poaching price and effort α < 1 to secure the retention
price. Consumers differ in their cost of effort, i.e. their switching costs. In this paper,
different from this chapter, first-period prices do not affect second-period actions, as
consumers only learn their switching costs after the first period. Esteves (2014) looks
at a model that is similar to the one presented here. She extends the Fudenberg and
Tirole (2000) with the possibility of retention offers. Crucially, however, she does not
allow consumers to strategically solicit an offer from the competing firm, in an attempt
to obtain a better deal from their current supplier. In her model, consumers do not
rationally foresee that retention offers will be made.
Finally note that retention offers differ from price-matching policies, in which a supplier
is always willing to match a lower price of a competitor. Such price-matching policies
do not depend on purchase behavior of consumers. Also, in the model presented here,
we will see that the equilibrium retention price is actually higher than the poaching
price offered by the competitor, simply because the consumer has already revealed a
preference for this supplier by her past buying behavior. Price-matching policies are
studied in e.g. Arbatskaya, Hviid and Shaffer (2004) and Corts (1997).
This chapter is organized as follows. First, section 4.2 introduces the model. Section 4.3
considers a benchmark in which there are no retention offers, but there is poaching and
heterogeneous switching costs. The model with retention offers is studied in section 4.4.
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4.2 The model
A unit mass of consumers is uniformly distributed on a Hotelling line. Transportation
costs are normalized to 1. Firms A and B are located at 0 and 1 respectively and face
marginal costs c. There are 2 periods. Consumers have unit demand in each period,
and willingness-to-pay r, gross of transportation costs. The market is fully covered.
Firms and consumers use a common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
There are two types of consumers: those with high switching costs zH , and those with
low switching costs zL < zH . The share of low types is given by λ ∈ (0, 1), independent
of location. Switching costs are incurred if a consumer switches suppliers in period
2. Switching costs consist of two elements. First, a consumer has to prepare for a
switch, for example by securing an offer from the competing supplier. Second, she
has to effectuate the switch, for example by actually signing a contract with the new
supplier.
For the analysis, it is crucial that actions taken to prepare for a switch satisfy three
conditions. First, they have to involve sunk costs to the consumer. Second, they have
to be revocable, in the sense that after incurring preparation costs, the consumer still
has the option to stick to her original supplier. Third, the costly actions have to be
observable to her original supplier. For example, consider a consumer that considers
to switch car insurers. She secures an offer from the other supplier, and then makes a
phone call to her current supplier to cancel her contract. The costs involved with these
actions are sunk. However, the switch is revocable: she may still change her mind and
stay with the current supplier. Finally, the current supplier observes that this consumer
has contacted her and, possibly, also that she has secured a competing offer. Hence, all
three conditions are satisfied.
We denote the costs for a type i ∈ {L,H} to prepare for a switch as z1i , and the
additional costs to perform the switch as z2i . We assume that both types of switching
















The timing of the game is as follows. In period 1, A and B simultaneously set prices
p1A and p
1
B , respectively. Consumers observe these prices, and decide where to buy in




buy from firm A. The other 1− xˆ1i will buy from firm B. We will refer to the consumers
that buy from A in period 1 as segment A, and to the consumers that buy from B
in period 1 as segment B. In period 2, the following sequence of events unfolds. In
the first stage, firms A and B simultaneously each set 2 prices, observable to everyone.
Firm A charges a loyalty price p2AA to consumers that bought from A in period 1, and
a poaching price p2AB to consumers that bought from B. Similarly, B sets prices p
2
BB
and p2BA. In the second stage, each consumer decides whether she incurs preparation
costs z1i . If she does, her original supplier can observe this and can make a retention
offer. The retention offer of firm A is denoted pRA, that of firm B is p
R
B .
For the analysis that follows to be valid, we need to impose some parameter restrictions.
These restrictions imply that in the benchmark model without retention offers for any
value of λ some, but not all, low type consumers, and some, but not all, high type
consumers are poached in the second period. Moreover, we want the same thing to be
true in the model with retention offers. As we will show in the analysis below, this
requires the following parameter restrictions to hold;
zL < 1; (4.1)
zH < 1/3 + 2zL/3; (4.2)
zH < 1/2 + z
2
L/2. (4.3)
4.3 Benchmark: no retention offers
Preliminaries We first consider a benchmark without retention offers. In that case,
the separation of total switching costs into preparation costs and effectuation costs is
immaterial. The timing of this simplified game is thus as follows. In period 1, A
and B simultaneously set p1A and p
1
B , and a fraction xˆ
1
i of type i consumers buys from
A. These consumers comprise segment A, the others segment B. In period 2, A
and B simultaneously set poaching prices and loyalty prices. We look for a symmetric
equilibrium and solve with backward induction.
Second period In equilibrium at least some type i consumers in segment A will
be tempted by the poaching price of firm B. The second period will then have some
xˆ2Ai < xˆ
1
i consumers again choosing for firm A, while the remaining xˆ
1
i − xˆ2Ai switch to
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B. Something similar holds for consumers in segment B. The indifferent types i on











1 + p2BB − p2AB − zi
)
, (4.4)
provided that these expressions are strictly between 0 and the relevant xˆ1i . Parameter
restrictions (4.1) and (4.2) assure that that is the case in equilibrium.1
Figure 4.1: Market segmentation in both periods, Benchmark.
Figure 4.1 depicts this situation. The top panel reflects consumers with high switching
costs, the bottom panel those with low switching costs. In period 1, those to the left of
xˆ1i buy from firm A and thus comprise segment A.
2 Those to the right of xˆ1i buy from
B and comprise segment B. In period 2, those in segment A that are located to the left
of xˆ2AH will buy from firm A (as reflected by the arrow), while those to the right will
buy from B. Something similar applies to those in segment B. As zH > zL, we have






BL: as their switching costs are higher, fewer
high types will switch in period 2.
1To have xˆ2Ai > 0, we need (2 + 3zi − 2z¯) > 0, hence 2z¯ < 2 + 3zi. We want this to be satisfied for
all λ. It is most restrictive for λ = 0, in which case it yields
2zH < 2 + 3zi. (4.5)
For the high types, this is always satisfied. For the low types, it requires 2zH − 3zL < 2.
In a symmetric equilibrium, we will have xˆ1i = 1/2. For the second period, we thus need xˆ
2
Ai < 1/2,
hence 2 + 3zi − 2z¯ < 3, so 3zi − 2z¯ < 1. We want this to be satisfied for all λ. It is most restrictive for
λ = 1, in which case it yields 3zi − 2zL < 1. For the low types, this requires (4.1). For the high types,
it requires 3zH − 2zL < 1, or (4.2). Note that if this is satisfied, (4.5) is satisfied as well.
2We will show below that xˆ1H = xˆ
1










≡ (p2AA − c)
[




λ(xˆ2BL − xˆ1L) + (1− λ)(xˆ2BH − xˆ1H)
]
, (4.6)
where Π2AA (the second line) reflects total profits from loyal consumers, and Π
2
AB (the







≡ (p2BA − c)
[




λ(1− xˆ2BL) + (1− λ)(1− xˆ2BH)
]
. (4.7)
For ease of exposition, we define z¯ as the weighted average of switching costs in the
population, and xˆ1 as the weighted average location of indifferent consumers in period
1:
z¯ ≡ λzL + (1− λ)zH , (4.8)
xˆ1 ≡ λxˆ1L + (1− λ)xˆ1H . (4.9)






1 + p2BA − p2AA + z¯
]
. (4.10)








1 + p2BA − p2AA + z¯
)]
, (4.11)
Maximizing (4.10) with respect to p2AA and (4.11) with respect to p
2












2xˆ1 − 1 + p2AA + c− z¯
)
.
Solving the system gives:
p2AA = c+
1
3 (1 + 2xˆ
1 + z¯); p2BA = c+
1
3 (4xˆ
1 − 1− z¯). (4.12)
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18 (1 + 2xˆ
1 + z¯)2; Π2BA =
1
18 (4xˆ
1 − 1− z¯)2. (4.14)













1− xˆ1 − 1
2
(






3 (3− 4xˆ1 − z¯); Π2AB = 118 (3− 4xˆ1 − z¯)2. (4.15)
First period We now solve for the first period. Consumers are forward-looking and
rationally take into account the events that will unfold in the second period. A consumer
that is indifferent between A and B in period 1 thus anticipates that, whatever she
chooses, she will switch in period 2. Denoting the discount factor by δ, the indifferent
type i located at xˆ1i has
r − xˆ1i − p1A + δ(r − (1− xˆ1i )− p2BA − zi)
= r − (1− xˆ1i )− p1B + δ(r − xˆ1i − p2AB − zi), (4.16)
where the left-hand side gives her total lifetime utility if she chooses A in period 1,
while the right-hand side gives that of choosing B in period 1. Note that switching
costs zi drop out of this equality; either way, in equilibrium this consumer will always




1. Solving (4.16) then gives
xˆ1 =
1 + p1B − p1A − δ(1 + p2BA − p2AB)
2(1− δ) . (4.17)












In the first period, firm A sets p1A as to maximize total discounted profits
ΠA = (p
1
A − c)xˆ1 + δΠ2AA + δΠ2AB
= (p1A − c)xˆ1 +
δ
18
(1 + 2xˆ1 + z¯)2 +
δ
18
(3− 4xˆ1 − z¯)2. (4.19)
Taking the derivative with respect to p1A :
∂ΠA
∂p1A













3− 4xˆ1 − z¯) ∂xˆ1
∂p1A
.
A symmetric equilibrium requires p1A = p
1
B hence xˆ =
1
















This yields equilibrium prices
p1A = p
1




We thus have the following:3
3The second-period profit functions (4.6) and (4.7) are clearly concave – provided that firms set
prices such that the indifferent high and low type consumers are both strictly between 0 and 1/2 in
equilibrium. Yet, it may still be profitable to do a large defection. We will show that that is not the
case. As in the main text, we focus on segment A.
First consider firm B. It can defect to a price p2BA that is so high that it only sells to the low types.
In equilibrium, that requires setting p2BA such that xˆAH ≥ 1/2, or 1 + p2BA − p2AA + zH ≥ 1. This
implies setting p2BA = p
2









1 + p2BA − p2AA + zL
)]
,




p2AA + c− zL
)
. At p2BA = p
2
AA − zH , these profits are
decreasing whenever p2AA − zH > 12
(
p2AA + c− zL
)
, hence if zH (λ+ 5)− zL (λ+ 3) < 2. This is most





zL which is exactly (4.2). Hence, we are on the downward
sloping part of piL. Therefore such a defection cannot be profitable.
Alternatively, firm B could set p2BA so low that we serve all the low types, so xˆ
2




AA − zL − 1 = c+
1
3
(2 + z¯)− zL − 1 = c+ 1
3
(z¯ − 1)− zL < c,
which is clearly unprofitable.
Now consider firm A. First, it can defect by setting p2AA so high that it only sells to the high types.




(1− λ) (p2AA − c) [1 + p2BA − p2AA + zH] ,




1 + p2BA + c+ zH
)
. At p2AA = 1 + p
2
BA + zL, these profits
are decreasing whenever 1 + p2BA + c + zH < 2p
2
BA + 2zL + 2 or −2zL − 43 + zH + z¯/3 < 0, which is
always the case. Hence, such a defection cannot be profitable.
502107-L-bw-Siekman
4
80 Search and Switching Costs
Proposition 4.1. In the benchmark without retention offers, equilibrium first-period,
loyalty and poaching prices are given by



















(8δ − 2z¯δ (2− z¯)) .
In a model with standard Hotelling competition, without poaching or switching costs,
we would have p = ph ≡ c + 1 in each period. From (4.1), we have z¯ < 1, hence
ph > pbmloyal > p
bm
poach. Hence, loyal consumers end up paying a higher price than those
that are poached by the other firm (pbmloyal > p
bm
poach). Also, the possibility of poaching
makes competition particularly fierce in the second period (pbmloyal < p
h). In the first
period, the effect is ambiguous. On the one hand, consumers are less sensitive to first
period prices;4 marginal consumers know that if they are tempted to consume their
less-preferred product, that will imply higher prices in period 2.5 On the other hand,
as switching costs increase, firms are more eager to attract consumers in period 1, as
consumers will be less inclined to switch, so second-period profits increase.6 As a result,
first-period prices are higher (pbm1 > ph) with low switching costs, but lower (p
bm
1 < ph)
with high switching costs. We also have:
Corollary 4.1. The total discounted price paid by both loyal and non-loyal consumers
is lower than that in a standard Hotelling model. All consumers are strictly better off.
Firms are worse off. Total welfare decreases.









Finally, firm A can defect by setting a lower p2AA, such that it serves all the high types. In that case
the profit function we use in the main text overestimates true profits (since it assumes a xˆAH > 1/2
rather than the true xˆAH = 1/2). As we cannot find a profit-increasing defection when looking at an
inflated profit function, such a profit-increasing defection definitely does not exist when looking at the
true profit function.




= 3/ (6 + 2δ) , whereas in a standard Hotelling model, we
would have ∂xˆ/∂ (pB − pA) = 1/2.
5From (4.12), an increase in xˆ1, the size of segment A, implies that both p2AA and p
2
BA increase.









poach − (1 + c) (1 + δ) = −
1
3
δ (1 + 3z¯) < 0.
These consumers now incur switching costs and a disutility from no longer consuming
their preferred product in period 2. However, if they would choose not to switch, they
would still be strictly better off than in a Hotelling model. Revealed preference implies
that their net utility from switching is only higher. As total discounted prices decrease
an the markets is covered, profits are lower. For total welfare, prices are just a transfer.
With poaching, some consumers incur switching costs, and a utility loss from no longer
consuming their preferred product. From a welfare perspective, that is a loss. 
4.4 Introducing retention offers
Preliminaries We now consider the full model and analyze whether there is an equi-
librium in which retention offers occur. We thus look for an equilibrium where low
types that do not switch always pay the retention price while high types that do not
switch pay the loyalty price.
We solve with backward induction and again focus on segment A; consumers that have
bought from firm A in period 1. For retention offers to occur in equilibrium, we need
that low types that buy again from A go for the retention offer pRA, while high types
prefer the loyalty price p2AA. For the low types, we thus need that the inspection costs




AA, while for the high types the
opposite is true. An equilibrium with retention offers thus requires
z1L < p
2
AA − pRA < z1H . (4.21)
As we are interested in situations where retention offers indeed occur in equilibrium,
below we will derive parameter restrictions such that these conditions are indeed sat-
isfied. Note that in equilibrium all low types incur the inspection costs z1L. Hence, a
low type that decides to switch rather than stay loyal to firm A, only incurs additional
switching costs z2L. In equilibrium, the loyal high types do not incur inspection costs.
Hence, high types that decide to switch incur an additional zH . We denote by z˜ the
weighted average of these additional switching costs. Hence
z˜ ≡ λz2L + (1− λ) zH . (4.22)
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Second period, second stage In stage 2 of period 2, firm A sets retention price pRA
to maximize profits, given the loyalty price p2AA and the poaching price p
2
BA that were
set in stage 1. All low types have already incurred the preparation costs z1L. A low
type that switches thus incurs an additional z2L and would pay p
R
A when sticking to A.
A high type that switches incurs an additional zH and would pay p
2
AA when sticking to
A. Hence, the indifferent consumers in segment A are given by
xˆ2AL =
1
2 (1 + p
2
BA − pRA + z2L); xˆ2AH = 12 (1 + p2BA − p2AA + zH). (4.23)
Firm A’s second-period profits from segment A now equal
Π2AA = λ(p
R











(1− λ)(p2AA − c)
(
1 + p2BA − p2AA + zH
)
. (4.24)










Second period, first stage Maximizing (4.24) with respect to p2AA yields the first-





1 + p2BA + zH + c
)
. (4.26)































1 + p2BA − p2AA + zH
))
.
Taking the first-order condition yields the reaction function
p2BA =








For the equilibrium, we plug in the reaction function of firm A, (4.26) to find
p2BA =






p2BA = c+ b, (4.28)
with
b ≡ 4xˆ
1 − z˜ − 1
3− λ (4.29)






1 + z2L + b
)
; p2AA = c+
1
2 (1 + zH + b) . (4.30)









4 (1 + zH + b) , (4.31)
provided that these expressions are strictly between 0 and the relevant xˆ1i . Given that
we already impose (4.1), parameter restriction (4.3) assures that that is the case in











(1− λ) (1 + zH + b)2 . (4.32)














7First note that we immediately have xˆ2Ai > 0. To have xˆ
2










1− (λz2L + (1− λ) zH)
3− λ
which is increasing in λ (as the numerator is increasing and the denominator decreasing). We want












For the low types, this implies z2L < 1, which is always satisfied given that (4.1) is satisfied. For the






< 1, which is implied by (4.3).
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4xˆ1 − z˜ − 1− b) = 1
4
(2− λ)b2. (4.33)
On segment B, we have a similar analysis that yields




4 (2− λ)a2, (4.34)
with
a ≡ 3− 4xˆ
1 − z˜
3− λ
the price-cost margin on A’s poaching prices.
First period Again, the indifferent consumer in period 1 is given by (4.17): retention
prices do not affect first-period market shares, as the marginal consumer will always
switch. Substituting for p2AB and p
2
BA from (4.28) and (4.34) into (4.17):
xˆ1i =











(3− λ) (1 + p1B − p1A)+ δ (1 + λ)
8δ + (3− λ) (2− 2δ) .
Total profits for firm A are now given by
ΠA = (p
1
A − c)xˆ1 + δΠ2AA + δΠ2AB










(1− λ) (b+ 1 + zH)2 + δ
4
(2− λ)a2. (4.35)
Taking the derivative with respect to p1A :
∂ΠA
∂p1A




























































8δ + (3− λ) (2− 2δ) ,
the first-order condition becomes8




+ (b+ 1 + z˜) δ − 2 (2− λ) aδ
8δ + (3− λ) (2− 2δ) = 0.
Equilibrium requires p1A = p
1
B , hence xˆ = 1/2 and a = b =
1−z˜
3−λ . Solving for equilibrium
prices then yields:
Proposition 4.2. With the possibility of retention offers, equilibrium first-period, loy-
alty, poaching and retention prices are given by
pret1 = c+ 1− 3δ
z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(





(1 + zH + b) ;





1 + z2L + b
)
, (4.36)














(1− λ) (b+ 1 + zH)2 + δ
4
(2−λ)b2. (4.37)









Consumers that go for a retention offer thus pay a higher price than what they would
pay if they would switch. As their original supplier knows that these consumers have a
8It is readily checked that the second-order condition is satisfied as well.
9Clearly pretloyal > p
ret





we have that pretpoach < p
ret
retent. Note







)− 2 (1− zH)
3− λ
)
The numerator is given by
λ− λz2L + 2zH − 2 < λ− λ (2zH − 1) + 2zH − 2
= −2 (1− zH) (1− λ) < 0
where the first inequality follows from (4.3). Hence pretloyal < ph. This establishes the ranking. Finally,
note that
pret1 − ph = −3δ
z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(
3− λ2 + λ)
(3− λ)2 .
With λ = 0, this equals δ (1− 2zH) /3, the sign of which is ambiguous.
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preference for their product, they do not have to fully compensate for the lower price
of the other firm.
Poaching prices are decreasing in switching costs zH and z
2
L: the higher these, the more
of an effort firms have to make to poach consumers. At the same time, an increase in
these switching costs increases loyalty prices, as firms have to make less of an effort to
retain consumers. These comparative statics are the same to those in the benchmark
model. Retention prices increase in z2L. Only low types end up paying this price, and
an increase in their switching costs makes it easier to retain them. First period prices
decrease in zH and z
2
L. As it becomes harder to poach consumers in the second period,
it becomes more profitable to attract them in the first period. Hence, an increase in
switching costs deceases first-period prices.
In the benchmark model (that added switching costs and poaching to a standard
Hotelling model), we compared the total discounted price, consumer welfare, profits
and total welfare to that in the Hotelling model. It is less straightforward to do that
once we also add retention offers; all comparisons then become ambiguous.10 Anyhow,
it is far more interesting to compare a world in which retention offers are possible to one
where they are not; doing so allows us to truly evaluate the welfare effects of retention
offers per se. We wil do so in the next section.
As a final technical aside, note that we need some parameter restrictions for our sepa-








z2H − z1H < z2L. (4.39)
4.5 The effects of retention offers
Comparing the model with the possibility of retention offers to the benchmark model,
we now have the following:
Proposition 4.3. Introducing the possibility of retention offers in our benchmark model
has the following effects on prices:
(i) First-period prices, poaching prices, and loyalty prices all increase.




(ii) New poaching prices are still lower than benchmark loyalty prices. New loyalty
prices are higher than benchmark poaching prices.
(iii) Retention prices are always higher than benchmark poaching prices, and higher
than benchmark loyalty prices if and only if λ is high enough.
Summarizing, we have pret1 > p
bm








Proof. In appendix B. 
To see what drives these results, note the following. First, for the low types, effective
switching costs decrease. Ceteris paribus, when viewed in isolation, this would lead to
a lower price charged by firm A and a higher price charged by firm B (see e.g. equation
(4.12)). Second, the loyalty price will now only be paid by high types. These are
reluctant to switch, leading to higher loyalty prices. In turn, when viewed in isolation,
these higher loyalty prices also allow firm B to charge higher poaching prices. Both
channels lead to higher poaching prices. Also, note that average effective switching
costs decrease. That implies that firms become less eager to capture consumers in
period 1, hence first-period prices increase.
The welfare effects of retention offers are as follows:
Proposition 4.4. The possibility of retention offers increases equilibrium profits and
decreases total consumer surplus. Each high type consumer is worse off. Only some
individual low type consumers that end up paying the retention price, may be better off.
Total welfare effects are ambiguous.
Proof. In appendix B. 
Hence, although the possibility of retention offers may seem at first sight to benefit
consumers, that is not the case in our equilibrium analysis. In our model, retention
offers serve to screen consumers with high switching costs from those with low switching
costs, allowing firms to effectively price discriminate against high cost consumers, which
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hurts such consumers. Yet, consumers with low switching costs are often also worse
off. They are forced to incur some of their switching costs in order to qualify for the
retention offer, even if they do not intend to switch. Moreover, this lowers their effective
switching costs, making competition for them less fierce in the first period. As a result,
firms benefit from having the possibility of making retention offers.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the practice of retention offers. In a two-period Hotelling
model, two firms practice behavior based price discrimination. In the second period,
they can try to poach consumers by offering them a better deal. However, firms can
retaliate by making a retention offer. Consumers differ in their switching costs. In
equilibrium, low-switching-cost consumers always solicit a retention offer, while this is
too costly for high-switching-cost consumers. As a result, retention offers allow firms
to effectively price discriminate against high-switching-cost consumers.
We find that the possibility of retention offers increases firm profits. All high-cost
consumers are worse off, but some low-cost consumers may benefit. Prices increase.
From a welfare perspective, more wasteful switching costs are incurred, as all low-cost
consumers solicit a costly offer from the competitor in order to secure a retention price.
4.A Comparing retention offers to prices in a Hotelling
model
Corollary 4.2. In a model with retention offers, compared to a Hotelling model,
(i) the total discounted price paid by loyal consumers is lower for low enough λ and
the comparison is ambiguous otherwise;
(ii) that paid by consumers that switch is either always lower, or is higher for high
enough λ and lower otherwise;
(iii) that paid by consumers that pay the retention price is higher for high enough λ
and lower otherwise;




(v) total welfare decreases.
Proof. First consider the loyal consumers. Using (4.22) and (4.36),
P retloyal ≡ pret1 + δpretloyal
= c+ 1− 3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(
3− λ2 + λ)





(1 + zH + b)
)
= Ph − 3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(
3− λ2 + λ)













16zH − 15z2L + 7
)− λ2 (6zH − 7z2L + 3)− 6zH
(3− λ)2 .
With λ = 0, the numerator is −6zH < 0. With λ = 1, it is 4zH − 8z2L + 4 > 0, which is
ambiguous. For consumers that are poached, we have from (4.22) and (4.36)
P retpoach ≡ pret1 + δpretpoach
= Ph − 3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(
3− λ2 + λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(
1− z˜
3− λ − 1
)
= Ph + δ
z˜ (4λ− 9) + 6λ− 2λ2 − 3
(3− λ)2 .
For λ = 0, the numerator is −9z˜− 3 < 0. For λ = 1, it is 1− 5z2L, which has ambiguous
sign. The derivative of the numerator with respect to λ is 4z˜ + 6− 4λ > 0.
For consumers that pay the retention price, again using (4.22) and (4.36),





= Ph − 3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(
3− λ2 + λ)


















22zH − 21z2L + 7
)− λ2 (7zH − 8z2L + 3)+ 9z2L − 15zH
(3− λ)2 .
For λ = 0, the numerator is 9z2L− 15zH < 0. For λ = 1 it is 4− 4z2L > 0. The derivative
with respect to λ is
zH + 2λz
2




+ 7− 6λ > 0.
Profits in a standard Hotelling model are Πh = 12 (1 + δ) . We thus have


















(1− λ) (b+ 1 + zH)2 + δ
4
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2 − 4zH − 1
)








2 − 10z2L + 7
)
/32, which has ambiguous sign.
This establishes the result on profits. For total welfare, note that prices are just a
transfer. With retention offers, however, some consumers incur switching costs, while
no longer consuming their preferred product. From a welfare perspective, that is a
loss. 
4.B Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.3. To prove the Proposition, we will first establish that pret1 >




Consider the difference between pret1 and p
bm
1 :
∆p1 ≡ pret1 − pbm1 =
−3δ z˜ (2− λ)
(3− λ)2 + δ
(






6z1L (3− 2λ)− zH (3− 5λ)− 4λ− 2λ2 (zH − zL) + 9− 3λz2L
3 (3− λ)2
> λδ
6z1L (3− 2λ)− (3− 5λ)− 4λ− 2λ2 (zH − zL) + 9− 3λ
3 (3− λ)2
= λδ
6z1L (3− 2λ) + 6 + 2λ− 2λ2 (zH − zL)
3 (3− λ)2 > 0.















(1− z¯) = 1
3
λz1L > 0,
















































3zH − 3zL + z1L
)
> 0









(2 + z¯) < 0,
as the first term is strictly smaller than 1/2, while the second term is strictly bigger




Above, we showed that pretpoach > p
bm






pretretent ≷ pbmloyal :














1 + 11zH − 6z1L − 12z2L
)− 9 (zH − z2L)− 2λ2 (zH − zL)
6 (3− λ) .
This expression is positive if and only if the numerator is positive. For λ = 0, it equals
−9 (zH − z2L) < 0. For λ = 1, it equals 2zL − 6z1L − 3z2L + 1 = 1 − z2L − 4z1L, of which














(1− z¯) > 0,
as the first term is strictly larger than 1/2, while the second is strictly smaller than 1/3.
This establishes the result. 
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Proof of Proposition 4.4
We now set about proving Proposition 4.4. We proceed as follows. First, we compare
the total discounted prices that consumers end up paying under different circumstances.
These comparisons will prove useful in deriving our results. We then consider how
individual consumers are affected, and look at total welfare. After that, we consider
firm profits and total welfare, respectively.
The effect on total discounted prices
We can establish the following:
Lemma 4. Introducing the possibility of retention offers often increases the total dis-
counted prices paid by consumers. The only exceptions are the case in which a consumer
would be loyal in the benchmark, but would either get poached or get a retention offer
when retention offers can be made. Such consumers pay a lower total discounted price
if λ is low enough, but may pay a higher total discounted price if λ is high enough.




P retpoach > ≷
P retretent > ≷
P retloyal > >
Proof. Results involving P bmpoach follow directly from Proposition 4.3, as does P
ret
loyal >
P bmloyal. Let us now consider the expression ∆Prr-bl ≡ P retretent − P bmloyal. At λ = 0, we have
that pret1 = p
bm
1 , hence ∆Prr-bl = p
ret
retent − ployalbm = δ z
2
L−zH





L − 3z2L + 6
)
/12 > 0, which implies the statement in the Lemma
concerning this case. Finally, consider the expression ∆Prp-bl ≡ P retpoach − P bmloyal. It can
be shown that for λ = 0, we have that ∆Prp-bl = −δ (2zH + 1) /3 < 0, while for λ = 1,




4z1L − 11z2L + 3
)
, the sign of which is ambiguous. 
The effect on consumer welfare
Lemma 5. The possibility of retention offers makes all consumers strictly worse off,
apart possibly from those that pay the retention price in period 2.
Proof. For a single consumer, there are 6 possible options: she is poached both in the




she is poached in the benchmark and loyal in the retention scenario; she is loyal in the
benchmark but poached in the retention scenario; she is loyal in the benchmark, but
pays a retention price in the retention scenario, or she is poached in the benchmark and
pays a retention price in the retention scenario. We will refer to these 6 options as PP,
LL, PL, LP, LR and PR respectively. Note that not all 6 options necessarily occur in
equilibrium, depending on parameter values, either one may occur.
In all cases, the total discounted price that a consumer ends up paying is a disutility
for that consumer. A consumer that is poached in the second period has an additional
disutility of, first, the switching costs that she has to incur and, second, the utility
mismatch that is caused by the fact that she does no longer consume her preferred
product. A consumer that pays the retention price in the second period has an addi-
tional disutility that consist of the additional costs she has to incur to prepare for a
switch.
A consumer is worse off with the possibility of retention offers if the total disutility she
ends up with then is higher than her total disutility in the benchmark. We will refer to
the total disutility in scenario x if a consumer ends up paying a price of type y as Dxy .
Going through all possibilities:
PP The net difference in disutility in both scenarios equals that in total discounted
prices. As P retpoach > P
bm





LL The net difference in disutility in both scenarios equals that in total discounted
prices. As P retloyal > P
bm

























LR In this case, consider ∆Drr-bl ≡ Dretretent−Dbmloyal = P retretent + δz1L−P bmloyal. From the











/2 < 0. With λ = 1, we have that P retretent − P bmloyal
> 0, hence ∆Drr-bl > 0, rendering the net effect ambiguous.
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PR In this case, consider ∆Drr-bp(x) ≡ Dretretent −Dbmpoach(x). As we will see below, it
is now important to take into account that the disutility of a consumer that is





L − P bmpoach − δzL − δm(x)
= P retretent − P bmpoach − δz2L − δm(x),
with m(x) the mismatch of a consumer located at x ≤ 1/2 that gets poached: this
consumer’s transportation costs are now 1 − x whereas they would have been x
if she consumed her preferred product. Hence m(x) = 1− 2x. From the proof of
Proposition 4.3
pret1 − pbm1 = −3δ z˜(2−λ)(3−λ)2 + δ
(3−λ2+λ)
(3−λ)2 − δ3 (1− 2z¯)
Using the expressions for pbmloyal and p
ret
retent in Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 we find for
λ = 0 ∆Drr-bp(x) = δ
−4+zH−3z2L+12x
6 , which is ambiguous. Similarly, for λ = 1,
∆Drr-bp(x) = δ
−2+12z1L−6z2L+24x
12 which is ambiguous as well.

Lemma 6. Total consumer welfare decreases with the possibility of retention offers.
This holds both for the high types as well as for the low types when λ is large enough.
Proof. For the high types, this follows directly from Lemma 5 (note that high types
never pay the retention price). The analysis for the low types is more involved. Consider
segment A in the benchmark scenario. Total disutility of the low types that are loyal






P bmpoach + δzL
)
, as these consumers pay P bmpoach and also
incur switching costs in the second period. Moreover, each of these consumers incurs a
mismatch: her transportation costs are now 1 − x whereas they would have been x if















Hence total disutility of the low types in the benchmark is given by















With the possibility of retention offers low type consumers can obtain a retention offer
against cost z1L. Therefore we find that the total disutility of low types in with the
possibility of retention offers is given by
DretL ≡ 2xˆretAL ·
(



















Figure 4.2: Effect on disutility of low types of the possibility of retention offers.






































The figure gives the upper and lower bound of the effect of the possibility of retention offers on total
disutility of the low types, as a function of lambda.
It turns out to be impossible to compare these two expressions analytically. We therefore
resort to a numerical analysis. For all values of λ, Figure 3.2 gives the upper and the
lower bound on the net welfare effects for the low types of the possibility of having
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retention offers (thus on DretL −DbmL as defined above), for all admissible values of z1L,
z2L, z
1




From the figure, we have that welfare of the low types may improve with retention offers
for low enough λ. Only for those λ, we saw that the low types that buy from A in both
scenarios do pay a lower price under retention, while the number of low types that gets
poached decreases, lowering their costs of mismatch. For low λ, these positive effects
outweigh the negative effects of a higher poaching price and costs to secure a competing
offer. Note that we have not weighted the loss by the number of low type consumers,
which makes the graph easier to read.
Figure 3.3 shows the change in total consumer welfare. From the figure, for low λ, the
positive effects on the low types is outweighted by the negative effect on the high types,
rendering the net effect negative. For higher values, the effect is negative for both types,
so the total effect also is. 
The effect on profits
First note that equilibrium profits would obviously increase if all total discounted prices
in the retention scenario would be higher than those in the benchmark. Unfortunately,
that is not the case. From Lemma 4, consumers may end up paying a lower price if
they are loyal in the benchmark, but are either poached or pay the retention price in
the case where retention offers are possible.
With a unit mass of consumers that always buy in equilibrium, finding the scenario
with the highest profit is equivalent to finding the scenario with the highest average
price. Focusing on segment A without loss of generality, we have that the average price
paid in the benchmark is given by














11The analysis was done in MATLAB. For each of 100 values of λ between 0 and 1, we considered 50




H , as well as z
2
H to find the highest and the lowest possible value of the price effect
of retention offers, taking into account the conditions that have to be satisfied by our switching cost






H , and conditions (4.1)–(4.3), (4.38) and (4.39)). The analysis took
21 minutes on a 3.30 GHz 4GB RAM Windows 7 PC. The MATLAB code is available upon request.
Looking at a finer grid did not appreciably affect the outcomes. Note that in all figures, we have taken
δ = 1. The size of δ does not affect the qualitative analysis, however, as all comparisons we consider




Figure 4.3: Effect on consumer surplus of the possibility of retention offers.

































The figure gives the upper and lower bound of the effect of the possibility of retention offers on total
consumer surplus, as a function of lambda.
With the possibility of retention, it is given by














It turns out to be impossible to compare these two expressions analytically. We therefore
resort to a numerical analysis. For all values of λ, Figure 3.3 gives the upper and the
lower bound on the price effect of the possibility of having retention offers (thus on
P¯ ret − P¯ bm, as defined above), for all admissible values of the parameters z1L, z2L, z1H ,
and z2H , using an analysis very similar to that described above.
From the figure, it is immediate that average prices with retention are always higher
than those in the benchmark. As λ approaches zero, the price difference disappears.
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Figure 4.4: Effect on average price of the possibility of making retention offers.

































The figure gives the upper and lower bound of the effect of the possibility of retention offers on average
prices paid in equilibrium, as a function of lambda.
This is intuitive: with λ = 0, the number of low types is zero, so no retention offers
will be made, rendering the case with the possibility of retention offers identical to the
benchmark.
The effect on total welfare
Figure 3.4 reports on an analysis that is very similar to that in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, but




Figure 4.5: Effect on welfare of the possibility of making retention offers.



























The figure gives the upper and lower bound of the effect of the possibility of retention offers on total





Marital Infidelity and Impatience:
Infidelity and Smoking Habits∗
5.1 Introduction
Infidelity is a subject of substantial importance. It is, for instance, the cause of many
divorces.1 The dissolution of a household has severe economic consequences, e.g. the
loss of economics of scale, income and of future pension entitlements. Moreover, a
divorce might impact household members in non-pecuniary ways as well. Children’s
welfare might, for instance, be negatively affected by it, see for example Weiss and
Willis (1985). Even if a relationship survives a disclosed affair can have a significant
impact on the utility derived from the relationship as it signals marital dissatisfaction.
Additionally, it may result in re-negotiation of the marital terms. Moreover, adultery
matters as it is one of the possible forms of intercourse and sex plays an important role
in society. Testimonies to this are Akerlof, Yellen and Katz (1996) and Posner (1994),
which address topics like contraception, abortion and shot-gun marriages. Furthermore,
extramarital sex makes a substantial contribution to the spread of sexual diseases, see
e.g. Pongou (2009) and Pongou and Serrano (2013).
Fair (1978) is the first economist to study infidelity. He borrows the time allocation
∗This chapter is based on Siekman (2014).
1Cox (2008) rightfully points out that in some cases infidelity is not the cause of divorce but rather
a symptom of a bad match between spouses. In those instances an individual uses it as a strategy to
find a new match as the relationship will dissolve in any case. An affair will not change this outcome,
but might influence its timing.
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framework from Becker (1974) to develop a theory for time spent on extramarital affairs
and subsequently empirical tests it. A small literature on adultery emerged from this
paper. Although this literature considers a wide variety of possible determinants of
infidelity, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the fact that the consequences
of an affair lay in the future and thus should be discounted accordingly. A notable
exception is Smith (2012). His approach is based upon the literature of economics of
crime (e.g. Becker (1968)) and takes into account that cheating individuals are aware
that their spouse might give a punishment once the affair is discovered, which is the
rationale for them to try to conceal it. In the framework of Smith (2012) an individual’s
discount factor for these costs is permitted to depend on the level of education, which
affects the infidelity decision through other channels as well.
This chapter extends the theoretical model of Smith (2012), by allowing a person’s
discount factor to vary with a person’s level of impatience, and estimates it. In the
empirical analysis I use smoking behavior to measure impatience. It is an empirical
fact that smokers are more impatient than non-smokers, see for instance Fuchs (1982),
Mitchell (1999) or Bickel, Odum and Madden (1999). Munasinghe and Sicherman
(2006) and Khwaja, Sloan and Salm (2006) also establish that smoking is an indication
of a high discount rate. In addition, Gra¨nsmark (2012) shows that smokers are more
impatient among chess players. There are several other studies which have used smoking
habits as a measure of impatience. DellaVigna and Paserman (2005) use it in their
study of impatience on job search. Other papers introduce time preferences, measured
through smoking behavior, into the earnings regression to study the ability bias. (Evans
and Montgomery (1994), Chevalier and Walker (2001), Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer
(2003)). Pabilonia and Song (2013) find that smoking single mothers spend less time
on educational activities or meals with their children than non-smokers mothers do.
I find in my empirical analysis that the estimated coefficients on the variables related to
smoking habits are significant. In particular, I show that persons who (used to) smoke
regularly are more likely to have an affair. This result can be explained by the fact
that these people are generally more impatient. Hence, when modeling adultery the
associated discounted expected costs should be taken into account. This is a suggestion
Wax (2011) already made in his informal exposition on the role that time preferences
play in an individual’s decision on marriage and sexual behavior.
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My analysis sheds, in addition, some light on the relationship between infidelity and
education. Fair (1978) finds that education is negatively associated with infidelity and
occupation positively. This is somewhat surprising as he uses both as a proxy for wages,
and the time allocation framework cannot explain this result. In my model and that of
Smith (2012) the opposing signs of education and occupation can be explained by the
following mechanisms. Occupation is considered to be a measure of a person’s quality
as a sexual partner and the associated benefits from an extramarital affair. Occupation
does not capture a person’s sexual desirability fully, but still it is clearly positively
correlated with the socio-economic status of an individual. Education, on the other
hand, affects the likelihood of a liaison in three ways. First, schooling raises a person’s
social skills. Second, it affects an individual’s quality as higher educated persons are
able to find better jobs and higher wages, a channel Fair (1978) uses to justify schooling
as a wage proxy. These two effects add to the benefits of an affair and thereby raise
a person’s desirability. Third, higher educated persons discount the expected costs
of a liaison less. This effect works in the opposite direction, and provides the reason
why infidelity might be negatively associated with schooling. Smith (2012) finds as
Fair (1978) a negative relationship between schooling and adultery. I, however, show
that once one controls for impatience the discounting-effect of education is (partly)
filtered out. As the quality (signaling) effect of schooling becomes more dominant, the
association with infidelity becomes more positive. The relationship between education
and adultery even becomes positive for some estimations, thereby illustrating that it is
important to control for impatience in modeling extramarital sex.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 presents the theoretical
model. Section 5.3 gives an overview of the empirical literature related to this paper.
Section 5.4 describes the data used in the study, while Section 5.5 is devoted to the
methodology and consists of a discussion of the probit model, its heteroskedastic variant,
and the possible causes of heteroskedasticity in this particular setting. Section 5.6
presents the estimation results and Section 5.7 concludes.
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5.2 Theoretical framework
I extend the two period model suggested by Smith (2012) by introducing a variable that
captures impatience. This model builds upon Liu (2008) in using an economics-of-crime-
model to studying infidelity. Liu (2008) develops a dynamic model in which the possible
consequences of adultery are incorporated and the discovery of an affair is stochastic.
It is not unreasonable to use the economics-of-crime approach to model infidelity: in
some regions an extramarital affair was actually a criminal offence for a certain period
of time (see e.g. Rasmusen (2002)). Nowadays adultery is still considered undesirable
by many people which justifies my approach: less than 3% of the US General Social
Survey sample indicated that extramarital sex is “not wrong at all”.
In the model an individual chooses a level of infidelity b to maximize the following utility
function:
u(b, q, e, v, s) = r(b, q, e, v)−
J∑
j=1
β(e, s)zj(b, v)− p(b)β(e, s)c(b, q). (5.1)
Here r(b, q, e, v) gives the return of infidelity and c(b, q) represents the costs a person
might incur if adultery is discovered. Such costs might involve the termination of the
relationship with the spouse, retaliation, a change in the terms of marriage, or damage
to the individual’s reputation. p(b) gives the likelihood that an affair is discovered.
There are J other possible costs associated with an affair and which might be incurred
independent of discovery. zj(b, v) captures expected costs j ∈ {1 . . . , J} and might for
instance represent a sexual disease or unintended pregnancy. β(e, s) is a discount-factor
accounting for the time between the affair and its costs. q is the quality of a person and
captures physical attributes, personality and economic resources. The education level
of an individual is represented by e. v is a vector of variables influencing a person’s
opportunities for adultery (e.g. search costs), variables affecting the propensity to cheat
(e.g. gender), and individual characteristics that might affect the costs of an affair (e.g.
gender or religiousness). The novel aspect of this paper is that I consider the impact of
a person’s level of impatience, s, on the infidelity decision.
Let us consider the third term in (5.1) first. This term, the expected disutility from
punishment, is the reason why a person involved in an affair will try to conceal it. The
probability of getting caught p(b) is assumed to be increasing in the level of adultery:
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pb > 0. If an extramarital relationship is discovered the offender will incur a cost c > 0
imposed by the spouse. The severity of such sanctions is assumed to depend on the level
of adultery: cb > 0. Higher quality persons have more options outside the marriage
and therefore cq < 0. By arguments given in Becker and Mulligan (1997) β should
be allowed to depend on e, with βe > 0 and βee < 0.
2 The intuition is that higher
educated persons use higher weights for second period pay-offs as they are better able
to imagine outcomes of current behavior and they are superior in mentally simulating
possible scenarios. An alternative explanation, which Fuchs (1982) already provided,
is that individuals with a low discount factor might invest more in education. More
impatient persons discount the possible consequences of an affair more. Hence, β(e, s)
with βs < 0 and βss > 0.
3
The second term of (5.1) gives the J other expected costs of infidelity. zjb > 0 as a
higher level of infidelity leads to higher expected costs.
The benefits of an affair (r) are increasing in the level of infidelity but at a decreasing
rate: rb > 0 and rbb < 0. The quality of an individual influences the benefits of
an affair as a person of higher quality is able to attract more desirable bed-partners.
Hence, rq > 0 and rqq < 0. Education impacts the benefits of an affair because it
improves communicative and social skills. However the model allows education to have
an indirect effect through quality: qe > 0. Education might, for instance, contribute
positively to the economic resources of an individual.
Equation (5.1) gives rise to the following first order condition for an interior solution:




























2In Becker and Mulligan (1997) a consumer can choose how much effort and/or resources she
dedicates to imagining future outcomes. That is, a consumer faces a multi-period utility maximization
problem in which β(S) is the discount factor and she can increase S against some costs, e.g. buy a
piggy bank or become a member of a Christmas Club. βee < 0 is needed to make the model compatible
with the interpretation of Becker and Mulligan (1997) but it is not necessary for my analysis.
3βss > 0 allows my framework to be compatible with Becker and Mulligan (1997) but it is not
necessary for my analysis.
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(5.3)
The denominator is, as in Smith (2012), taken to be positive. For this to hold, given the
discussion above, it is sufficient for the costs of infidelity (c and z) and the probability
of discovery (p) to be linear in b.
There are three primary channels through which education influences the infidelity
decision. First, relational skills might benefit from schooling and in turn influence b∗
positively: rbe > 0. Second, education impacts quality positively (qe > 0) which affects
b∗ positively. The term rbq is positive as higher quality persons have a greater marginal
return to infidelity and therefore will have more affairs. cbq, on the other hand, is
assumed to be negative. The reason is that additional affairs will raise the probability
of detection, but the associated expected marginal costs decreases in an individual’s
quality. Third, educated individuals are more patient and weigh the expected costs of
an affair more. The sign of the numerator of (5.3) is therefore ambiguous. However,
once one controls for the impact of impatience on β this might reduce the influence
of education on it. Hence, βe might be smaller than in a model without a measure
of impatience, resulting in an increase of the marginal effect of education on infidelity.
In fact, this marginal effect may change from a negative to a positive one, and in the
empirical part of this chapter I find some evidence for this.4















From the arguments above both numerator and denominator are positive. Therefore
the model predicts that an increase in impatience leads to higher level of b∗. The
intuition is that impatient persons place a lower weight on the future consequences of
their actions: βs < 0.
4Evidence exists that more educated persons gain more from marriage (Gustafsson and Worku
(2005), Bruze, Svarer and Weiss (2012)) and have greater cross spousal productivity (Grossbard-
Shechtman (1993)). The model could therefore be extended to allow for education to increase the
costs of a liaison. This would add the term −β(e, s)(pBce + p(b)cbe) to the numerator of (5.3). This
makes a negative contribution to db
∗
de
under the assumption that education leads to higher costs of
an affair. The introduction of impatience in the discount factor would, however, generate the same
qualitative effect. Another direction to extend the model is to take into account that probability
of detection is decreasing in schooling as in Friehe (2008) and Lochner and Moretti (2004), thereby
providing another channel through which education positively affects adultery. One could also allow
education to affect z negatively. The intuition would be that the more educated are likelier to prevent
the expected costs of adultery, for instance by contraception.
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db∗
dq can be derived in a similar fashion and can be shown to be positive under the given
assumptions. The impact of v upon the optimal level of infidelity depends on the sign
of rbv or zbv. This results in the inference that b
∗ will be negatively related to search
costs and factors that increase the costs of an affair, for instance strong religious beliefs.
5.3 Related literature
Besides the earlier mentioned scientific articles there are several other papers that con-
tribute to the literature on infidelity. Cameron (2002), for instance, is closely related
to my work. He includes a very wide range of variables in his estimation to explain
extramarital sex. Most variables address past personal (sexual) history but he includes
risk proxies as well, amongst which are fear of AIDS and whether a person is a heavy
smoker and/or drinker. His estimates for the coefficients of the smoke-variables are in-
significant. However, this may be caused by including dummies on a person’s age when
having for the first time intercourse in the estimation. In particular, the dummy vari-
ables on when a person’s first sexual experience might cause this insignificance as they
are a proxy for impatience. Another paper related to my work is Yamamura (2012).
He finds, using Japanese data, that smokers are more likely to have a positive view on
extramarital sex than non-smokers.
The other research on infidelity can be classified roughly into two groups. First, a large
share of studies tried to verify the results of Fair (1978) with alternative econometric
methods, (e.g. Wells (2003); Li and Racine (2004); Wang (1997); Yen (1999); Cher-
nozhukov and Hong (2002)). Second, the other branch of literature basically suggest
new factors affecting adultery. This branch includes Treas and Giesen (2000), which
considers the impact of sexual tastes and values on infidelity, and Brooks and Monaco
(2013), which focuses on assortive mating. Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008) studies extra-
marital affairs but takes a more evolutionary biological approach by focusing on the
difference in adultery between men and women. Kuroki (2013) contributes by including
the opportunities for infidelity as explanatory variable proxied by workplace sex ratios.
Adamopoulou (2013) analyzes the seasonality and state dependence of infidelity. Potter
(2011) has data on wage rates and includes these in his empirical analysis.
502107-L-bw-Siekman
5
108 Search and Switching Costs
5.4 Data
In this study a time series of cross-sectional U.S. data from the General Social Survey
(GSS) is used. The survey asks demographic, attitudinal and habitual questions. Multi-
stage stratified sampling was used to obtain these data. In each stage selection was
either systematic or with a probability proportional to the size of a unit. More details
of the sampling procedure can be found in Smith, Marsden, Hout and Kim (2013).5
Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008), Kuroki (2013) and Smith (2012) employ this data as well
to study infidelity. My analysis is restricted to 1991, 1993 and 1994 as only in these
years information on both extramarital sex and smoking habits was inquired for. The
GSS consists of a set of questions asked to each subject and sets of questions asked to
random subsamples. I only employ the subsamples in which questions on both smoking
habit and infidelity were asked.6
Table 5.1 gives the selection procedure used to arrive at the dataset I work with. First,
the years 1991, 1993 and 1994 were selected for reasons described above. Second,
persons who never married, who are widowed or whose marital status is missing were
excluded from this study. Next I selected respondents who answered the question on
infidelity which reduces the sample size to 3794. The greatest part of this reduction is
due to fact that the question on infidelity was not posed in each subsample. Of the 4246
respondents less than 2.5% did not answer the question on extramarital affairs, which
supports the reliability of the data. The sample is further reduced by only retaining
observations for which smoking data is available: there are 21 observations dropped
because of incomplete response and another 2185 observations as these respondents did
not receive questions on smoking habits.
Dummy variables were created to capture smoking habits. Smoker takes the value 1 if
the respondent smokes and never attempted to quit. AttemptQuitSmoking equals 1 for
individuals who still smoke but who have tried to give up smoking. With ExSmoker
persons who used to smoke regularly are indicated.7
The infidelity dummy variable is assigned a value of 1 if a person answered affirmative
5http://www3.norc.org/GSS+Website/Documentation/
6The GSS use the terms ballot and version to indicate these subsamples. For my analysis I use
ballots B and C from 1991 and 1993. From 1994 I use sample A versions 2 and 3.
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Table 5.1: Sample Selection
Data Observations
All data 57061
Years 1991,1993 and 1994 6115
Never married excluded 4876
Widows excluded 4248
Marital status missing 4246
Infidelity data available 3794
Smoking data available 1588
to the question: “Have you ever had sex with someone other than your husband or wife
while you were married?” Of the men in the sample 20.27% admitted to have been
unfaithful, of the women 13.09%. Percentages of such magnitude are not uncommon
in the literature, especially for U.S. data. In other countries these figures tend to be
somewhat lower. Note that most papers employing U.S. data use the GSS as well,
although different years or versions. I only know of Adamopoulou (2013) who does not
use these data for the U.S., he finds lower percentages. However, he uses a different
definition of infidelity and only considers persons not older than 34. Adultery might
be subject to measurement errors as bragging might lead to an upward bias while
attempting to conceal an affair might lead to a downward bias. In addition, there
might be a recall bias and respondents might not be willing to disclose this very personal
and potentially embarrassing information. By employing a separate self-administered
questionnaire on sensitive issues, amongst which are infidelity and sexual behavior, the
survey attempted to minimize these measurement problems. As pointed out above, in
the sample less than 2.5% of the respondents did not answer the question on adultery,
which supports the reliability of the data.
Table 5.2 offers a first glance on the relationship between smoking habits and extra-
marital sex without controlling for any other factors. It suggest that the probability
of infidelity strongly increases with the impatience of a person, as measured by her/his
smoking habit.
I am interested in the relation between education and infidelity as well. A respondent’s
education level is captured by categorical binary variables which indicate the highest
degree a respondent attained. The reference category consists of individuals who fin-
ished high school and is indicated by the HighSchool variable. The BachelorOrMore
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Table 5.2: Smoking and infidelity





Total 1,588 16.12 χ23 = 41.8961
p-value < 0.0001
variable indicates a bachelor’s degree or higher, JuniorCollege equals 1 for individuals
who finished junior college, while LessThanHighSchool captures all individuals who
did not finish high school. Table 5.3 hints at a u-shaped relation between education
level and infidelity, with infidelity most common among individuals who completed high
school.
Table 5.3: Education and infidelity





Total 1,587 16.07 χ23 = 7.8246
p-value 0.0498
In the analysis I will control for several other factors that might impact the probability
of infidelity. I will match these controls to those in Smith (2012) and introduce several
new ones. Most variables are directly taken from the GSS, however, some variables
require a more elaborate discussion.
The Divorce variable indicates if a person has ever been divorced or legally separated.
In the dataset 6 persons indicated that they divorced or separated at least once, while
their answers to other questions contradict this. For these persons Divorce is recorded
as missing.
To allow all persons in his sample to have completed their education and have chosen
their job Smith (2012) does not consider individuals aged under 25 in his estimation.
I do not exclude these persons in my analysis here, however, I performed robustness
checks without them as well, leading to no significant difference in findings. I allow age
502107-L-bw-Siekman
5
Marital Infidelity and Impatience: Infidelity and Smoking Habits 111
to have a non-linear impact on the probability of an affair. In addition, the year of
birth is included in the analysis.
In my analysis I control for occupation and associated status by making use of Interna-
tional Socio Economic Index (ISEI) developed by Ganzeboom, De Graaf, and Treiman
(1992). This is a continuous measure of socio-economic status and reflects the income
and educational background of an occupation. The ISEI score can be matched to an
individual’s 1988 ISCO-code (International Standard Classification of Occupations),
which is developed by ILO and which is provided in the dataset. I use the latest version
of ISEI (ISEI-08: Ganzeboom and Treiman (2011)), which estimates the index using
both male and female respondents. Earlier versions only used data on males to calculate
ISEI scores. The new index should therefore be a better reflection of a person’s socio-
economic status, especially in female dominated occupations. Note that ISEI differs
from occupational prestige scales, as the latter are based upon subjective judgements
of “the general desirability of occupations”, Goldthorpe and Hope (1972), Goldthorpe
and Hope (1974).
Four dummy variables were created to control for an individual’s employment status.
FulEmp equals 1 for those who work fulltime and is the reference category. PartEmp
indicates that a person works part-time or (s)he has a job, but is not at work because of,
for instance, temporary illness, vacation, or strike. UnEmp groups all respondents who
are unemployed or retired. OtherEmpStatus captures all other persons, for instance,
those who are at school or keeping house.
I measure how religious an individual is on a four point scale. A person scores 1 if (s)he
never attends a religious service. A score of 2 is obtained if attending once per year
or less, while attending more than this but less than once per week results in a 3. A
4 is given to persons who attend services once per week or more. LogPopulation is
the log of the population size (rounded to the nearest thousand) of the place where the
respondent lives. Of places where the population was rounded to zero the log of 0.25
was taken. It is incorporated in my estimations as well as a proxy for the opportunity of
infidelity. The Children variable gives the number of children present in the household.
One potential issue might be that (ex-)smokers are more outgoing and sociable than
non-smokers and therefore have more opportunities for infidelity. As a form of sensitivity
analysis I therefore will include the SocBar variable in my specification. This variable
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measures how often a person goes to a tavern or bar: never (assigned value 1), once per
year or less (assigned 2), more than this but less than once per week (assigned 3) or
once per week or more (assigned value 4). Unfortunately, data on this variable is only
available for a small subsample, so it is not included in the main analysis.
Except the variables discussed, all other controls are dummy variables. Table 5.4 pro-
vides some descriptive statistics on the variables involved in the analysis. The differences
between the conditional and unconditional means indicates the importance of control-
ling for these variables. Illustrative is, for instance, that the percentage females is much
higher under the faithful people. Moreover, the frequency of bar and tavern visits is
higher amongst those who admitted to have been unfaithful.
Table 5.4: Descriptive statistics
Variable
Unconditional Faithful Unfaithful
Obs Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Infidelity 1588 0.161 0.368
Female 1588 0.577 0.494 0.598 0.490 0.469 0.500
Age 1585 45.232 14.557 45.498 15.001 43.852 11.927
Black 1588 0.092 0.289 0.080 0.272 0.152 0.360
OtherRace 1588 0.038 0.191 0.038 0.192 0.035 0.185
SocioEconomicIndex 1545 46.002 20.398 46.574 20.424 43.055 20.042
LessThanHighschool 1587 0.158 0.365 0.161 0.367 0.145 0.353
HighSchool 1587 0.529 0.499 0.515 0.500 0.604 0.490
JuniorCollege 1587 0.070 0.255 0.071 0.256 0.067 0.250
BachelorOrMore 1587 0.243 0.429 0.254 0.435 0.184 0.389
Religion 1559 2.766 1.025 2.822 1.0165 2.468 1.022
LogPopulation 1588 3.220 2.224 3.184 2.256 3.410 2.044
Children 1578 0.902 1.149 0.915 1.148 0.835 1.154
Divorce 1582 0.393 0.488 0.340 0.474 0.665 0.473
FulEmp 1588 0.5516 0.4975 0.5435 0.4983 0.5938 0.4921
PartEmp 1588 0.1215 0.3269 0.1201 0.3252 0.1289 0.3358
UnEmp 1588 0.1341 0.3409 0.1336 0.3404 0.1367 0.3442
OtherEmpStatus 1588 0.1927 0.3945 0.2027 0.4022 0.1406 0.3483
SocBar 817 1.8849 1.0032 1.7980 0.9764 2.3488 1.0205
Obs gives the number of observations
SD gives the Standard Deviation
5.5 Methodology
To determine the relationship between infidelity and the in Section 5.4 suggested vari-
ables I estimate a probit model. Assuming that the same theoretical factors are involved
in the determination of the likelihood and quantity of infidelity, the model above sug-
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gest to include individual quality and education amongst the set of control variables.
Several model-specifications will be estimated with a varying set of controls because
some of these might have an endogeneity issue (e.g. whether a person has children).
I extend the analysis by considering a heteroskedastic probit model. Let y denote the




1 if x′β + u > 0
0 if x′β + u ≤ 0,
where x is a vector of explanatory variables and the error term u is standard normal
distributed. Therefore Pr[y = 1|x] = Φ(x′β). In the heteroskedastic model that I
consider u ∼ N(0, exp(2z′γ)) and consequently






One of the factors used to model heteroskedasticity is gender because there is a difference
in infidelity strategies between men and women according to the literature, see e.g.
Cox (2008) and Elmslie and Tebaldi (2008). There it is argued that women are more
reluctant to commit adultery as they put a higher valuation on the resources provided
by the partner to the relationship (and children). Females are only willing to put the
relationship at risk when the potential bed-partner has good genes or is wealthy. The
probability that males cheat, on the other hand, is less dependent on these factors. As
they do not value a stable relationship as high they are on average less faithful. All
together this means that females might display higher variation in (expected dis-)utility
derived from infidelity and its possible consequences. The age of an individual is part
of the variance equation as well. The reason is that young people are more attractive as
a possible candidate for a liaison, but as age progresses not only the level but also the
variation in attractiveness drops. An indicator variable whether a person has ever been
divorced or legally separated is included in z too. Divorced persons might be likelier to
have an affair as they might have had an affair before and that was the reason they got
divorced in the first place. On the other hand, divorce might have been a traumatic
experience for an individual and (s)he might want to avoid going through it again, thus
reducing the likelihood of adultery. Hence, divorced persons exhibit a greater variation
in their evaluation of infidelity.
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5.6 Estimation results
This section first presents the results from the main analysis. Subsequently, estimations
only using individuals in their first marriage are shown, followed by estimations control-
ling for the number of bar/tavern visits. These last two estimations are not included in
the main analysis as they reduce the number of observations substantially.
All estimations are weighted by sampling probability weights. Standard errors are
corrected for the survey-design as suggested in the documentation provided with the
GSS dataset. These standard errors take stratification and the clustered nature of the
sample into account. Variables for stratification and clustering, as well as the sampling
weights, were directly taken from the GSS dataset. Strata containing a single sampling
unit were assigned to a neighboring stratum.
In Table 5.5 the results of several probit estimations are presented along with the
marginal effects. In the first column I only include basic individual characteristics
besides the variables that capture smoking habits. Specification (2) is a benchmark
with exactly the same variables as in Smith (2012). The only differences between my
analysis and his is the sample, as I want only individuals on which there is data on
smoking habits, and that he does separate estimations for men and women. I refrain
from this separation as the number of observations is rather small. The third model
extends this benchmark with the smoke variables. The fourth estimation drops the
number of children from the specification, as it might suffer from an endogeneity issue.
The fifth specification includes it along with an indicator of ever being divorced. In (6)
I include variables on occupation status. Column 7 estimates a heteroskedastic probit
model as a robustness check.
A subset of smoking-habit variables is statistically significant in all presented specifica-
tions. Remarkably, individuals who smoke and never attempted to quit have a higher
likelihood of having an affair than those who made such an attempt. The coefficients
of both these groups are larger than that for ex-smokers, who in turn have a higher
coefficient than individuals who never smoked. These results provide evidence for the
hypothesis that impatient persons are likelier to have an affair.8 It is interesting to
8An alternative explanation is that smokers don’t discount the costs of an affair less, but underes-
timate these costs all the time. However, this seems less plausible.
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Table 5.5: Probit estimates of marital infidelity
Dependent variable:
extramarital affair (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Smoking habits. Reference category: Never smoked
Smoker 0.5922*** 0.4772*** 0.4956*** 0.4579*** 0.4510*** 0.5816***
(0.1489) (0.1587) (0.1595) (0.1597) (0.1602) (0.2190)
M.E. 0.1616 0.1226 0.1285 0.1108 0.1088 0.1179
AttemptQuitSmoking 0.4669*** 0.3895*** 0.3787*** 0.3061*** 0.2981** 0.4496**
(0.1040) (0.1106) (0.1094) (0.1143) (0.1163) (0.1992)
M.E. 0.1141 0.0916 0.0891 0.0671 0.0651 0.0831
ExSmoker 0.2161** 0.1736 0.1722 0.1954* 0.1981* 0.2051
(0.0972) (0.1054) (0.1054) (0.1114) (0.1108) (0.1482)
M.E. 0.0495 0.0385 0.0383 0.0414 0.0420 0.0337
Female -0.2490*** -0.2937*** -0.2537*** -0.2515*** -0.2964*** -0.3150*** -2.5777
(0.0814) (0.0797) (0.0811) (0.0819) (0.0864) (0.0910) (3.0881)
M.E. -0.0553 -0.0648 -0.0550 -0.0547 -0.0613 -0.0652 -0.0761
SocioEconomicIndex -0.0013 -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0004 0.0008 0.0021
(0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0029)
M.E. -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.0003
Religion -0.1811*** -0.1466*** -0.1539*** -0.1263*** -0.1248*** -0.0989**
(0.0382) (0.0385) (0.0387) (0.0399) (0.0392) (0.0486)
M.E. -0.0392 -0.0313 -0.0330 -0.0257 -0.0254 -0.0159
LogPopulation 0.0188 0.0191 0.0204 0.0121 0.0127 0.0199
(0.0212) (0.0216) (0.0213) (0.0215) (0.0219) (0.0213)
M.E. 0.0041 0.0041 0.0044 0.0025 0.0026 0.0032
Education. Reference category: High School
LessThanHighschool -0.2340* -0.2854** -0.2627** -0.2704** -0.2752** -0.3044*
(0.1197) (0.1201) (0.1174) (0.1263) (0.1271) (0.1602)
M.E. -0.0465 -0.0549 -0.0512 -0.0500 -0.0508 -0.0437
JuniorCollege -0.1177 -0.1097 -0.1050 -0.1406 -0.1350 -0.1780
(0.1827) (0.1842) (0.1849) (0.1907) (0.1875) (0.2285)
M.E. -0.0242 -0.0224 -0.0215 -0.0270 -0.0260 -0.0262
BachelorOrMore -0.2239* -0.1832 -0.1982 -0.1320 -0.1294 -0.2254
(0.1204) (0.1223) (0.1243) (0.1279) (0.1278) (0.1499)
M.E. -0.0459 -0.0374 -0.0405 -0.0263 -0.0255 -0.0346
Children -0.0650* -0.0655* -0.0352 -0.0391 -0.0375
(0.0367) (0.0366) (0.0383) (0.0386) (0.0480)
M.E. -0.0141 -0.0140 -0.0072 -0.0080 -0.0060
Divorce 0.6144*** 0.6180*** 0.0889
(0.0949) (0.0970) (0.1545)
M.E. 0.1384 0.1391 0.1364

















No. of observations 1585 1503 1503 1513 1497 1497 1497
Wald test joint significance
Smoking habits 8.8977*** 5.1064*** 5.1359*** 3.9286*** 3.7268** 2.4853*
Education 2.2478* 2.4883 * 2.3550* 1.860 1.8682 1.5268
All estimations include a constant term, age, age squared, year of birth and controls for ethnicity. Estimates for these coefficients
are not reported here but are available upon request. Standard errors in parentheses. M.E. is shorthand for Marginal Effect,
averaged over individuals. Note that for binary variables these effects are the difference in the predicted probability of an affair
when the variable changes from 0 to 1.
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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compare the marginal effects of the first specification with the differences in percent-
ages in Table 5.2 between a certain group and the persons who never smoked. The table
indicates, for instance, that amongst smokers who never made a quit-attempt 17.72%
(28.18−10.46) more persons had an affair. The estimated marginal effect for this group
is of the same magnitude, 16.16%. Similar findings hold for the other groups, although
the differences between the marginal effects and the percentages that can be derived
from Table 5.2 become somewhat larger once one includes more control variables.
Comparing specifications (2) and (3) provides some evidence that controlling for impa-
tience affects the relation between education and infidelity. In particular, once impa-
tience is incorporated, the coefficient on Bachelor reduces in magnitude and becomes
insignificant. On the other hand, the coefficient on LessThanHighschool amplified.
The marginal effects display similar effects. The reasoning behind these changes is
that, once one controls for impatience, the role the educational level plays in explaining
the discount factor is reduced. Hence the ability of education to signal quality and
enhanced relational skills now dominates the impact education has on the likelihood of
having an extramarital affair. Overall, this results in a more positive relation between
education and the probability of infidelity than as suggested by benchmark specification
(2).
From Table 5.5 one can conclude that men are more likely to be involved in an extramar-
ital affair than women, which is in line with existing literature. Reasons might be that
women bear the risk of pregnancy, might have greater moral or religious constraints,
and might have a more difficult time on the remarriage market. Moreover, I find that
more religious persons are less likely to have a paramour. The variables on employment
status are insignificant, which might be attributed to the fact that the model already
included a socio-economic index.
There is some evidence that the number of children is negatively associated with the
probability of infidelity. Divorce has a highly significant positive coefficient in the
fifth specification. However, both these variables might be endogenous. An initial bad
match between spouses might reduce the likelihood of having children and increase the
probability of both an affair and divorce. Consequently, no causal interpretation can be
given to these results. I include these variables, however, to make comparison possible
to the results found in the literature.
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To verify the validity of the model I performed a normality test on specification (6)
and found that normality could not be rejected. As a robustness check I extended the
analysis with specification (7) which allows for heteroskedasticity. A Wald-test suggests
joint significance of the variance equation. Clearly Divorce seems to be the driving
force behind heteroskedasticity. Moreover, younger persons seem to display somewhat
more hetereoskedasticity. There are not many differences between the estimated level-
coefficients of homoskedastic and heteroskedastic specifications (6) and (7). First, the
estimated female and divorce coefficients are no longer significant, but this might be
due to their inclusion in both the level and variance equation. Second, the estimated
coefficients on the employment status change somewhat, but they remain insignificant.
Most importantly, when controlling for heteroskedasticity the relation between infidelity
and smoking remains significant. However, the difference between current smokers and
other individuals becomes larger.
Including divorced persons in the analysis might cause both endogeneity and hetero-
geneity issues. I therefore re-do the analysis for persons who are in their first marriage.
Table 5.6 presents the results of this exercise. The subsample of individuals in their
first marriage is rather small and the percentage unfaithful has dropped from 16.1%
(see Table 5.4) to 8.9%, both affecting the precision of the estimates negatively. No
heteroskedastic specification is reported, although it was estimated, but the variance
equation became insignificant as Divorce was no longer part of it.
Again I find that impatience, as measured by smoking habits, is significant in explaining
infidelity. As before females and religious persons are less likely to have an affair. Once
one controls for impatience, the effect of education on infidelity is altered in the same
directions as before and the relationship between these variables becomes significant.
However, the effects are rather small for this subsample. As a final robustness check
I include a variable on the frequency of bar/tavern visits in my analysis. As not all
respondents were interviewed on this topic, this reduces the sample size significantly.
Table 5.7 gives the estimations. I present both results on the entire sample and on the
sample of persons in first marriage. Moreover, each specification is estimated with and
without SocBar to first see what the effect is of using a subsample, rather than the
full one, and to see the effect of the variable’s introduction. The estimations are the
equivalents of specifications (1) and (6) of Table 5.5.
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Table 5.6: Probit estimates of marital infidelity for persons in 1st
marriage
Dependent variable:
extramarital affair (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Smoking habits. Reference category: Never smoked
Smoker 0.8642*** 0.8589*** 0.8585*** 0.8633***
(0.2091) (0.2165) (0.2155) (0.2193)
M.E. 0.1964 0.1904 0.1899 0.1250
AttemptQuitSmoking 0.4099*** 0.3938** 0.3921** 0.3988**
(0.1569) (0.1620) (0.1628) (0.1658)
M.E. 0.07042 0.0663 0.0658 0.0577
ExSmoker 0.2795* 0.2651* 0.2528 0.2689*
(0.1530) (0.1584) (0.1606) (0.1554)
M.E. 0.0443 0.0414 0.0392 0.0390
Female -0.2725** -0.3444*** -0.2965** -0.2983** -0.2859**
(0.1289) (0.1183) (0.1271) (0.1282) (0.1356)
M.E. -0.0405 -0.0525 -0.0436 -0.0437 -0.0414
SocioEconomicIndex 0.0040 0.0048 0.0046 0.0055
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0043)
M.E. 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008
Religion -0.1771*** -0.1347** -0.1335** -0.1247**
(0.05674) (0.0575) (0.0573) (0.0567)
M.E. -0.0266 -0.0196 -0.0194 -0.0181
LogPopulation 0.0092 0.0091 0.0095 -0.0043
(0.0270) (0.0285) (0.0285) (0.0289)
M.E. 0.0014 0.0013 0.0014 0.0006
Education. Reference category: High School
LessThanHighschool -0.2192 -0.2985 -0.3058 -0.3059
(0.2008) (0.2017) (0.2035) (0.2029)
M.E. -0.0298 -0.0381 -0.0387 -0.0443
JuniorCollege -0.2547 -0.2455 -0.2476 -0.2324
(0.2797) (0.2940) (0.2946) (0.2995)
M.E. -0.0332 -0.0313 -0.0314 -0.0336
BachelorOrMore -0.4556** -0.4302** -0.4315** -0.4271**
(0.2097) (0.2116) (0.2118) (0.2109)
M.E. -0.0609 -0.0561 -0.0561 -0.0618
Children 0.0221 0.0326 0.0238
(0.0582) (0.0567) (0.0589)
M.E. 0.0033 0.0048 0.0034










No. of observations 961 917 917 923 917
Wald test joint significance
Smoking habits 6.4591*** 5.7841*** 5.7512*** 5.6508***
Education 2.0158 2.1358* 2.1701* 2.1440*
All estimations include a constant term, age, age squared, year of birth and controls for ethnicity.
Estimates for these coefficients are not reported here but are available upon request. Standard
errors in parentheses. M.E. is shorthand for Marginal Effect, averaged over individuals. Note
that for binary variables these effects are the difference in the predicted probability of an affair
when the variable changes from 0 to 1.
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
502107-L-bw-Siekman
5
Marital Infidelity and Impatience: Infidelity and Smoking Habits 119
Table 5.7: Probit estimates of marital infidelity when controlling for social behavior
Dependent variable: Entire sample Respondent in 1st marriage
extramarital affair (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Smoking habits. Reference category: Never smoked
Smoker 0.5592*** 0.5489** 0.5146** 0.5043** 0.9290*** 0.9203*** 0.9123*** 0.8957***
(0.2152) (0.2208) (0.2190) (0.2245) (0.2650) (0.2676) (0.2698) (0.2730)
M.E. 0.1485 0.1399 0.1260 0.1201 0.2242 0.2174 0.1401 0.1355
AttemptQuitSmoking 0.4231*** 0.3583** 0.3186** 0.2544 0.5042** 0.4687** 0.4971** 0.4521**
(01488) (0.1575) (0.1551) (0.1605) (0.2086) (0.2112) (0.2267) (0.2292)
M.E. 0.1003 0.0808 0.0695 0.0534 0.0943 0.0851 0.0764 0.0684
ExSmoker 0.1428 0.1118 0.0688 0.0484 0.1122 0.0786 0.0171 -0.0155
(0.1562) (0.1594) (0.1616) (0.1605) (0.2545) (0.2578) (0.2342) (0.2318)
M.E. 0.0315 0.0237 0.0141 0.0096 0.0181 0.0124 0.0026 -0.0023
Female -0.2525** -0.1489 -0.1918 -0.1364 -0.1822 -0.1340 -0.1382 -0.1027
(0.1107) (0.1170) (0.1336) (0.1390) (0.1632) (0.1703) (0.1753) (0.1821)
M.E. -0.0549 -0.0311 -0.0392 -0.0271 -0.0289 -0.0209 -0.0212 -0.0155
SocioEconomicIndex 0.0037 0.0047 0.0051 0.0057
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0053)
M.E. 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 0.0009
Religion -0.1731*** -0.1525** -0.1104 -0.0976
(0.0635) (0.0649) (0.0789) (0.0815)
M.E. -0.0349 -0.0301 -0.0170 -0.0148
LogPopulation 0.0120 0.0075 0.0113 0.0076
(0.0255) (0.0255) (0.0320) (0.0314)
M.E. 0.0024 0.0015 0.0017 0.0011
Education. Reference category: High School
LessThanHighschool -0.1790 -0.1298 -0.4015 -0.3360
(0.1802) (0.1814) (0.2589) (0.2521)
M.E. -0.0339 -0.0245 -0.0617 -0.0508
JuniorCollege -0.2995 -0.3115 -0.4773 -0.4681
(0.2415) (0.2349) (0 .3594) (0.3574)
M.E. -0.0530 -0.0538 -0.0733 -0.0708
BachelorOrMore -0.0877 -0.1423 -0.3594 -0.3909
(0.1671) (0.1694) (0.2471) (0.2489)
M.E. -0.0173 -0.0272 -0.0552 -0.0592
Children -0.0289 -0.0078 0.0037 0.0158
(0.0553) (0.0554) (0.0880) (0.0878)




Employment Status. Reference category: Full time employed
PartEmp -0.0689 -0.0479 -0.1455 -0.1335
(0.1674) (0.1749) (0.2659) (0.2732)
M.E. -0.0136 -0.0093 -0.0224 -0.0202
UnEmp 0.1658 0.2249 0.5067* 0.5471**
(0.2297) (0.2264) (0.2756) (0.2745)
M.E. 0.0355 0.0480 0.0778 0.0828
OtherEmpStatus -0.0967 -0.0189 0.0489 0.0911
(0.2041) (0.2094) (0.2840) (0.2850)
M.E. -0.0189 -0.0037 0.0075 0.0138
SocBar 0.2660*** 0.2231*** 0.1747** 0.1737*
(0.0556) (0.0587) (0.0846) (0.0913)
M.E. 0.0549 0.0440 0.0270 0.0263
No. of observations 815 815 782 782 494 494 481 481
Wald test joint significance
Smoking habits 3.7776** 2.8983** 2.6203* 2.0653 5.0206*** 4.7156*** 4.6062*** 4.2371***
Education 0.7183 0.7452 1.7670 1.6601
All estimations include a constant term, age, age squared, year of birth and controls for ethnicity. Estimates for these coefficients are
not reported here but are available upon request. Standard errors in parentheses. M.E. is shorthand for Marginal Effect, averaged over
individuals. Note that for binary variables these effects are the difference in the predicted probability of an affair when the variable
changes from 0 to 1.
* significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.
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The relationship between impatience, proxied by smoking, and infidelity is again signif-
icant. When SocBar is included the size of the smoke-variables is somewhat reduced,
which might be explained by the fact that they might capture how social a person is
as well, but they remain substantial and significant. Remarkably, some variables, e.g.
Female and Religion, are now insignificant for some specifications, which might be
caused by the limited sample size.
5.7 Conclusions
In this chapter I estimated several models for infidelity. I found that (ex)smokers have
a significant higher probability of having an affair. Results suggest that smokers who
never made an attempt to quit are the most likely to have an extramarital affair, the
likelihood for smokers who did make such an attempt is somewhat smaller, followed
by ex-smokers and persons who never smoked, respectively. The link between smoking
habits and impatience is a well-established empirical fact in the literature. Conse-
quently, my findings imply that more impatient persons are likelier to be involved in
affairs. One might argue that smokers are more sociable and this drives my findings.
However, when controlling for the sociability of individuals, as measured by the number
of bar and tavern visits, the results on smoking survive.
The second contribution of this paper revolves around the relationship between educa-
tion and adultery. Other studies have found that the likelihood of a liaison decreases
with the level of education and Smith (2012) argues that this is caused by more edu-
cated persons having a higher discount factor. I introduce impatience in the theoretical
framework and show that this (partly) filters out the discounting effect of education.
This means that the quality signaling role of education, caused by more schooled per-
sons having on average more economic resources, becomes more dominant. The effect
that education might attribute to a person’s relational skills becomes more important as
well. Overall the introduction of impatience leads to a more positive effect of education
on the likelihood of infidelity. The empirical findings support these theoretical results.
In some estimations the effect of education on the probability of adultery actually is
positive rather than negative.
All in all, I showed that expected costs of a liaison and impatience play a significant
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Economie is een wetenschap die de verdeling van schaarse goederen bestudeert. Er
zijn veel economische modellen ontwikkeld om te onderzoeken hoe men deze goederen
efficie¨nter kan verdelen. Pas sinds de tweede helft van de vorige eeuw is echter het
besef gekomen dat er belangrijke fricties actief zijn op markten die leiden tot markt-
onvolkomenheden, falen of een substantie¨le herverdeling van welvaart. Dit proefschrift
richt haar focus op twee van zulke fricties, namelijk zoek- en overstapkosten, en hun
interactie met andere economische fenomenen.
Zoekkosten zijn kosten die voor rekening van de consument komen om informatie over
een product te verkrijgen en de prijs ervan te achterhalen. Deze kosten kunnen ver-
schillende vormen aannemen. Voorbeelden zijn: benzinekosten die gemaakt worden om
een winkel te bezoeken, tijd die besteed wordt aan het lezen van een productomschrij-
ving of de energie- en internetkosten voor het bezoeken van websites. Overstapkosten,
daarentegen, zijn kosten die men maakt om van leverancier te wisselen wanneer men al
op de hoogte is van de productspecificaties en de prijs van het product. Deze kosten
kunnen bestaan uit een boete vanwege het vroegtijdig bee¨indigen van een contract of
de administratieve kosten en moeite om partijen te informeren over een nieuw telefoon-
of bankrekeningnummer. Een ander voorbeeld van overstapkosten is aanwezig in de
trouwmarkt, waar het wisselen van partner kan leiden tot verlies van inkomen of het
contact met de kinderen.
Dit proefschrift heeft tot doel inzicht te verschaffen in de processen die spelen op mark-
ten waar zoek- en overstapkosten een significante rol spelen. Het proefschrift is op-
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gesplitst in bestaat uit twee delen. Het eerste deel bevat twee hoofdstukken waarin
onderzoek wordt gedaan naar het zoekgedrag van consumenten. In het tweede deel
worden twee hoofdstukken gepresenteerd die zich richten op markten met overstapkos-
ten.
Hoofdstuk 2 van dit proefschrift bestudeert de interactie tussen zoekkosten en loss aver-
sion. Loss aversion is het concept dat een consument additionele (dis)utiliteit ervaart
wanneer een uitkomst negatief (positief) afwijkt van een referentiepunt, hetgeen vaak
is gebaseerd op de verwachtingen van een consument.
Een deel van de bestaande literatuur onderzoekt al hoe bedrijven deze aversion uitbui-
ten. Deze veronderstelt echter dat consumenten op de hoogte zijn van alle aanbiedingen
op de markt. Consumenten moeten dus gelijktijdig alle producten die worden aange-
boden evalueren, en dus meteen bepalen of zij deze en de voorgestelde prijzen mee of
tegen vinden vallen. Een setting waarin consumenten sequentieel de producten en bij-
behorende prijzen beoordelen zou enigszins natuurlijker zijn. Een consument kan dan
teleurgesteld zijn als het product dat ze overweegt of de bijbehorende prijs slechter is
dan gedacht, en gebaseerd daarop kan ze beslissen of ze nog verder wil zoeken naar een
betere aanbieding.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt een dergelijke setting bestudeerd. In het daar gepresenteerde
model zoeken consumenten sequentieel tegen bepaalde kosten op een markt met gedif-
ferentiee¨rde producten en kan een consument teleurgesteld (of blij verrast) zijn als ze
op een product of prijs stuit die tegenvalt (of meevalt).
Een van de bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2 is dat loss aversion leidt tot een scala aan
equilibrium prijzen. De bovengrens van dit scala stijgt in de mate van loss aversion,
maar in tegenstelling tot de bestaande literatuur kan de ondergrens hier in dalen. Dus,
loss aversion kan leiden tot lagere prijzen.
Loss aversion kan via drie dimensies consumenten be¨ınvloeden. Ten eerste in de prijs-
dimensie: consumenten zijn teleurgesteld wanneer ze op een hogere prijs stuiten dan
verwacht. Afzonderlijk beschouwd leidt deze dimensie tot lagere prijzen omdat be-
drijven meer terughoudend zijn met prijsverhogingen. Ten tweede heeft loss aversion
invloed via de zoek-dimensie. Consumenten kunnen teleurgesteld zijn als ze meer moe-
ten zoeken dan verwacht. Afzonderlijk beschouwd leidt loss aversion in deze dimensie
tot hogere prijzen omdat het effectief de zoekkosten verhoogt. Ten derde heeft loss
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aversion een effect in de dimensie die meet hoe goed een product bij een consument
past, de match-dimensie. Loss aversion in deze dimensie leidt tot een grotere set aan
overeenstemmingswaarden en dus tot meer productdifferentiatie. Dit leidt tot hogere
prijzen.
Al met al heeft loss aversion een ambigu effect op prijzen. Daarom wordt ook een
equilibrium verfijning ge¨ıntroduceerd in hoofdstuk 2. De unieke prijs die deze verfijning
overleeft daalt in de mate van loss aversion voor niet al te lage waardes. Een andere
bevinding in hoofdstuk 2 is dat consumenten met loss aversion meer zoeken wanneer
zoekkosten relatief laag zijn, maar minder als deze hoog zijn.
Hoofdstuk 3 draagt bij aan de literatuur over het zoekgedrag van consumenten op mark-
ten met gedifferentiee¨rde producten. De literatuur neemt aan dat consumenten op een
dergelijke markt willekeurig zoeken terwijl in hoofdstuk 3 de zoekvolgorde afhangt van
de voorkeuren van de consument. Ter illustratie, een consument die op zoek is naar een
woning in de nabijheid van haar werk zal niet aan de andere kant van de stad beginnen
met zoeken. Vaak helpt een platform consumenten geschikte producten te vinden. Een
consument vult haar voorkeuren bijvoorbeeld in op een zoekmachine of vergelijkingssite
en het platform suggereert dan een verkoper die het meest waarschijnlijk het beste aan
de wensen van de consument kan voldoen. Als een consument dan een product, in dit
voorbeeld een huis, vervolgens heeft bekeken, kan zij beslissen om het te kopen of nog
even verder te zoeken, bijvoorbeeld omdat de indeling van het huis niet naar haar smaak
is. In het model van hoofdstuk 3 beginnen consumenten dus te zoeken daar waar zij
het best geschikte product verwachten, gebaseerd op het advies van een derde partij.
Het hoofdstuk slaat een brug tussen twee extreme gevallen in de consumenten-zoek-
literatuur. Aan de ene kant omvat het model van hoofdstuk 3 het model waar consu-
menten geheel willekeurig zoeken, maar het omvat ook de situatie waar consumenten
perfect ge¨ınformeerd zijn over alle producten op de markt voor bepaalde waardes van
de parameters.
Een belangrijke bevinding van het model van hoofdstuk 3 is dat prijzen en winsten
hoger zijn in vergelijking met modellen waarin consumenten geheel willekeurig zoeken.
De reden is dat het onwaarschijnlijker is dat consumenten een concurrent bezoeken als
ze eerst de verkoper bezoeken waar ze het product verwachten te vinden dat het beste
aansluit bij hun voorkeuren. Dit maakt dat ex-ante producten minder homogeen zijn
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voor consumenten. Daarnaast laat het hoofdstuk zien dat prijzen stijgen in zoekkosten,
wat in lijn is met de bestaande literatuur.
Hoofdstuk 3 presenteert ook een aantal bevindingen aangaande welvaart. Consumenten
verkrijgen gemiddeld genomen een product dat beter bij hun voorkeuren past wanneer
ze bij het bepalen van de zoekvolgorde rekening houden met deze voorkeuren. Boven-
dien stoppen consumenten, in elke fase van het proces, eerder met zoeken. Dit komt
omdat zij zich realiseren dat ze eerst het product bekijken dat in bepaalde gebieden
het beste bij hun voorkeuren past. Hieruit volgt ook meteen dat consumenten minder
uitgeven aan zoekkosten wanneer zij de zoekvolgorde laten afhangen van hun voorkeu-
ren. Deze twee effecten tezamen leiden ertoe dat de totale welvaart hoger is onder
het ge¨ıntroduceerde zoekproces. Consumenten zijn echter slechter af dan in de situatie
wanneer ze willekeurig zouden zoeken omdat deze effecten teniet worden gedaan door
de hogere prijzen die producenten kunnen vragen.
De resultaten in hoofdstuk 3 staan haaks op enkelen in de literatuur die zijn afgeleid
aan de hand van een model waarin een verkoper prominent is, en in tegenstelling tot
het model in hoofdstuk 3, door alle consumenten als eerste bezocht wordt. In een
dergelijk model is de prijs van de eerste verkoper lager dan dat van de concurrenten
en lager dan in het geval van willekeurig zoekgedrag omdat de vraag elastischer is. In
hoofdstuk 4 zet deze verkoper dezelfde prijs als haar concurrenten welke hoger ligt dan
in het geval van willekeurig zoeken. Daarnaast verkrijgen consumenten in een dergelijk
model gemiddeld genomen een product dat verder van hun voorkeuren afligt omdat ze
vaker genoegen nemen met minder vanwege de lagere prijs van de prominente verkoper.
In een dergelijk raamwerk is de totale welvaart lager dan in het geval van willekeurig
zoekgedrag, terwijl in hoofdstuk 4 de introductie van zoeken gebaseerd op voorkeuren
leidt tot hogere welvaart. Dit leidt tot een belangrijke beleidsimplicaties. Beschouw
een scenario waarin een platform de totale welvaart op een markt naar zich toe kan
trekken door kosten in rekening te brengen aan verkopers en consumenten. Hoofdstuk
3 suggereert dan dat het platform consumenten moet koppelen aan verkopers gebaseerd
op voorkeuren om winsten te maximaliseren.
In hoofdstuk 4 worden retentie-aanbiedingen bestudeerd. Dit zijn verbeterde aanbie-
dingen die bedrijven doen aan consumenten die aangeven hun relatie met het bedrijf,
bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van een abonnement of een bankrekening, te willen bee¨indigen.
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Consumenten reageren op verschillende wijze op dergelijke praktijken. Sommige consu-
menten zijn actief op zoek naar een retentie-aanbod terwijl anderen vaak helemaal geen
weet hebben van het bestaan van dergelijke aanbiedingen.
Hoofdstuk 4 bestudeert een setting waarin er twee types consumenten zijn, namelijk die
met relatief lage, en die met relatief hoge overstapkosten. Retentie-aanbiedingen kunnen
dan door bedrijven gebruikt worden als filtering-mechanisme. Consumenten die al de
moeite hebben genomen een aanbieding van een concurrent te bemachtigen, geven het
signaal af dat ze lage overstapkosten hebben en daarom makkelijk overstappen. Door
middel van retentie-aanbiedingen kunnen bedrijven dus discrimineren op prijs.
Het hoofdstuk beschouwt dus situaties waarin consumenten hun huidige abonnement
kunnen opzeggen ten faveure van dat van een concurrent. Als een consument bijvoor-
beeld van zorgverzekering wil veranderen moet ze, voor de daadwerkelijke overstap,
de huidige opzeggen. Dit biedt haar huidige verzekeraar de gelegenheid een verbeterd
aanbod te doen.
Het model in hoofdstuk 4 bestaat uit 2 periodes waarin 2 bedrijven gedifferentieerde
producten verkopen. In periode 1 vind er gewone concurrentie plaats. In periode 2,
daarentegen, kunnen bedrijven drie verschillende prijzen vragen: een prijs voor loyale
consumenten, een prijs voor overstappers, en een retentie-prijs voor consumenten die
de intentie hadden over te stappen maar toch zijn gebleven.
Wat hoofdstuk 4 uniek maakt in vergelijking met de literatuur is dat consumenten
strategisch kunnen handelen door een overstap te simuleren om zodoende een retentie-
aanbod te verkrijgen. Een dergelijke simulatie kost wel wat, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van
moeite, tijd of geld. Consumenten met lage overstapkosten zullen het toch de moeite
waard vinden om een dergelijke actie uit te voeren. Dit biedt bedrijven de mogelijkheid
tussen consumenten met verschillende overstapkosten te prijsdiscrimineren.
De analyse van hoofdstuk 4 suggereert dat de mogelijkheid van retentie-aanbiedingen
leidt tot hogere prijzen. De prijs voor loyale consumenten stijgt omdat zij gemiddeld
genomen niet snel overstappen. De prijzen die bedrijven gebruiken om consumenten
te stelen van de concurrentie stijgen echter ook. Dit wordt veroorzaakt door het stra-
tegisch handelen van sommige consumenten die al vast een deel van de overstap in
gang te zetten, ook al hebben ze niet de intentie om over te stappen. Ook suggereert
het hoofdstuk dat de prijzen stijgen voor consumenten die nog aan geen enkel bedrijf
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gebonden zijn. Dit komt omdat de competitie voor deze consumenten in periode 2 he-
viger wordt omdat enkelen van hen al een overstap in gang zetten, ook al zijn ze niet
voornemens de overstap daadwerkelijk te maken. De mogelijkheid van het doen van
retentie-aanbiedingen heeft een ambigu effect op de welvaart. Bedrijven kunnen hogere
winsten behalen terwijl alle consumenten tezamen slechter af zijn.
Hoofdstuk 5 bestudeert de trouwmarkt: een markt met substantie¨le overstapkosten
wanneer men van partner wisselt. Om precies te zijn, hoofdstuk 5 onderzoekt of er een
relatie bestaat tussen ongeduld en huwelijkse ontrouw; de eerste stap in het wisselen
van partner.
Vreemdgaan is een onderwerp van een niet te onderschatten belang. Overspel kan
leiden tot een scheiding met bijbehorende economische consequenties zoals het verlies
van inkomen of schaalvoordelen. Daarnaast zijn er vanzelfsprekend ook niet-monetaire
gevolgen. Zelfs als een relatie een buitenechtelijke affaire overleeft, heeft dit vaak tot
gevolg dat de verstandhoudingen binnen het huwelijk zijn verstoord.
De bestaande literatuur negeert vaak het feit dat de consequenties van een buitenech-
telijke affaire in de toekomst liggen en dat ze daarom gedisconteerd dienen te worden.
Een overspelige weet namelijk dat zijn/haar partner mogelijkerwijs achter de affaire
komt en hij/zij dan gestraft zal worden, en zal de consequenties wegen met een dis-
conteringsfactor. Sommige artikelen gebruiken het scholingsniveau als proxy voor de
disconteringsfactor. Dit niveau heeft echter ook invloed op de kans op overspel via
andere kanalen.
Hoofdstuk 5 maakt gebruik van het ongeduld om de disconteringsfactor te benaderen
en toont aan dat mensen die ongeduldiger zijn vaker een buitenechtelijke affaire hebben.
Als proxy voor ongeduld wordt het rookgedrag van individuen gebruikt omdat er volgens
de bestaande literatuur een sterk verband is tussen beide. Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat
(voormalige) rokers vaker overspelig zijn.
Ook werpt het hoofdstuk nieuw licht op de relatie tussen het scholingsniveau en over-
spel. Educatie kan via drie wegen een effect hebben op de kans op vreemdgaan. Ten
eerste heeft scholing een effect op de kwaliteit van een individu omdat beter geschoolde
personen over het algemeen betere banen kunnen bemachtigen met bijbehorend salaris.
Ten tweede heeft scholing een positief effect op de sociale vaardigheden van een persoon.
Scholing vergroot via deze twee mechanismen de aantrekkelijkheid van een persoon en
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maakt een affaire aanlokkelijker. Ten derde hebben beter geschoolde personen gemid-
deld genomen een lagere disconteringsfactor. Dit kan verklaren waarom overspel een
negatieve relatie kan vertonen met opleidingsniveau zoals wordt gevonden in de be-
staande literatuur. Hoofdstuk 5 vindt echter dat dit disconteringseffect van educatie
(deels) wordt uitgefilterd als men rekening houdt met het ongeduldigheidsniveau van
een persoon. Het effect dat educatie heeft op een persoon zijn aantrekkelijkheid wordt
effectief gezien belangrijker waardoor de relatie tussen scholing en overspel positiever
wordt. In sommige schattingen vind ik zelfs, in tegenstelling tot de literatuur, een
positieve relatie tussen scholing en overspel.
Al met al geeft deze dissertatie interessante inzichten in de effecten van zoek en overstap-
kosten, eventueel in combinatie met andere economische fenomenen zoals loss aversion
en retentie-aanbiedingen. Een belangrijke conclusie is dat bedrijfsactiviteiten die op het
oog lijken bij te dragen aan het consumentensurplus, bijvoorbeeld retentie-aanbiedingen
of het communiceren van product informatie, in werkelijkheid een negatief effect hebben
op het welvaren van consumenten. Bedrijven profiteren juist van dergelijke activitei-
ten. Daarnaast blijken heterogene overstapkosten een relevante invloed te hebben op
marktmechanismen. Hoofdstuk 5 toont empirisch de effecten van verschillende compo-
nenten van deze kosten, terwijl hoofstuk 4 aantoont dat deze heterogeniteit strategische
mogelijkheden biedt. Ook mag de invloed van gedragsbiassen op marktwerking niet
worden onderschat, zoals blijkt uit hoofdstuk 2 waar loss aversion de hoogte van prij-
zen be¨ınvloedt. Economisch beleid (voor markten met zoek- en overstapkosten) en de
modellen waarop deze gestoeld wordt zou dus rekening moeten houden met al deze
fenomenen alvorens conclusies te trekken.
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